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A TRIBUTE TO
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN:
"THE KIND VOICE OF FRIENDS"
In this symposium my part is only to sit in silence. To express
one's feelings as the end draws near is too intimate a task. But I
may mention one thought that comes to me as a listerner-in. The
riders in a race do not stop short when they reach the goal. There
is a little finishing canter before coming to a standstill. There is
time to hear the kind voice of friends and to say to one's self: "The
work is done." But just as one says that, the answer comes: "The
race is over, but the work never is done while the power to work
remains." The canter that brings you to a standstill need not be
only coming to rest. It cannot be, while you still live. For to live
is to function. That is all there is in living.
And so I end with a line from a Latin poet who uttered the
message more than fifteen hundred years ago:
"Death plucks my ear and says, 'Live - I am coming."'*
* THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 178
(M.DeW. Howe ed., 1962) (emphasis added) (printing text ofJustice Oliver Wendell
Holmes' radio address to the Nation on the occasion of his 90th birthday, March 8,
1931). Special thanks to Professor Paul R. Bajer for bringing Justice Holmes'
remarks to the attention of the Law Review.
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A TRIBUTE TO HARRY A. BLACKMUN
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST*
Harry Blackmun is a son of the upper Mississippi Valley. He was
born in Nashville, Illinois, in 1908, and grew up in St. Paul, Minneso-
ta. His appointment to the Supreme Court by President Nixon on
June 9, 1970 filled one of the most storied seats on the Supreme
Court, one previously occupied by the likes of Joseph Story, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo, and Felix Frankfurter. Although
he oftenjoked about being "old number three," the appointment was
a deserved one, for then-Judge Blackmun's forty year career as a
lawyer and jurist was exemplary.
After graduating with honors from the Harvard Law School in 1932,
he clerked forJudge John B. Sanborn at the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. He then practiced law with the firm of Dorsey,
Colman, Barker, Scott and Barber in Minneapolis until 1950, when he
became General Counsel to the Mayo Clinic. President Eisenhower
appointed him to be ajudge of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in 1959, where he served until his appointment to the
Supreme Court.
Justice Blackmun will surely be remembered most for his opinion
for the Court in Roe v. Wade.1 That opinion has received so much
notoriety that it is easy to forget that during his nearly twenty-five
years on the Court he has authored more than three hundred
majority opinions. As a result, his jurisprudential legacy includes not
only the right of privacy embodied in Roe v. Wade, but opinions
covering other areas of the law as well.
In Complete Auto Transit v. Brady,2 he succinctly enunciated the
modem rule that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution does not
prevent interstate commerce from being required to bear its fair share
* ChiefJustice of the United States.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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of state taxation. His legacy includes Flood v. Kuhn,3 which sustained
baseball's antitrust exemption and demonstrated the Justice's
knowledge of, and love for, baseball.
Justice Blackmun was cautious, studious and meticulous in his
opinions, always willing to view a case from every angle and to
consider each argument made by the parties. His many writings on
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment are illustrative. In Wyman v.
James,4 his first majority opinion, Justice Blackmun rejected a Fourth
Amendment challenge to a New York law conditioning welfare
benefits on in-home visits by caseworkers. Non-adversarial visits, he
concluded, were minimally intrusive and were designed to benefit
dependent children. "The dependent child's needs are paramount,
and only with hesitancy would we relegate those needs, in the scale of
comparative values, to a position secondary to what the mother claims
as her rights."5
Justice Blackmun's 1987 opinion in New York v. Burger,6 rejecting
a Fourth Amendment challenge to New York's law authorizing
warrantless inspections ofjunkyards, was similarly practical. With an
eye toward overall reasonableness, Justice Blackmun concluded that
the warrantless searches were permissible because (1) junkyards have
reduced expectations of privacy, (2) government has a strong interest
in combatting car theft, (3) inspections are necessary to uncover
quickly disposable stolen parts, (4) the regulatory scheme provided an
adequate substitute for warrants, and (5) inspections were carefully
limited.
Four years later, in California v. Acevedo, 7Justice Blackmun ruled for
the Court that police may search a bag found in an automobile
without a warrant. Because of the practical difficulties associated with
distinguishing a search targeting a car (which required no warrant)
from one directed at baggage in a car (which after United States v.
Ross8 still required a warrant), Justice Blackmun's majority opinion
dispensed with the distinction. He concluded that Ross tended to
"confuse[] courts and police officers and impede[] effective law
enforcement."9
3. 407 U.S. 258 (1971).
4. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
5. Id. at 318.
6. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
7. 111 S. CL 1982 (1991).
8. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
9. 111 S. CL at 1989.
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Justice Blackmun's structural opinions exhibit similar practical
traits. In Mistretta v. United States,"0 for example, his majority opinion
sustained the design of the United States Sentencing Commission.
Taking a "pragmatic, flexible view of differential governmental
power,""1 Justice Blackmun's opinion concluded that the delegation
of power to the Commission, the inclusion of federal judges in its
membership, and the formal location of the Commission within the
Judicial Branch, did not offend separation of powers. As a functional
matter, Justice Blackmun observed, the Commission was really no
different than any other independent agency.
Justice Blackmun's 1991 decision in Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue12 sustained the authority of the Chief Judge of the United
States Tax Court, an Article I tribunal, to appoint special trial judges.
Justice Blackmun concluded that although the Tax Court was not a
"department," it was a "court of law," and thus could appoint
"inferior" officers of the United States. A contrary holding, he
explained, would "undermine longstanding practice." "
Finally, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,'4
Justice Blackmun wrote to uphold the application of federal minimum
wage and hour laws to local governmental employees. Taking care to
explain his departure from precedent, Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion held that under the special circumstances of the case it was
best to overrule prior case law and leave to Congress and the political
system the role of accommodating the-interests of federalism.
Justice Blackmun's opinions convey only part of his legacy; he will
also be remembered for the personal qualities he brought to the
Court during his twenty-four years of service. His friend, Garrison
Keillor, in his book Lake Wobegon Days, describes a small, fictional
community in Minnesota nestled against a blue-green lake, with "one
traffic light, which is almost always green."15 Just like the town itself,
the motto inscribed on the town's crest is modest-"sumus quod
sumus," (We are what we are). 6 Harry Blackmun has much in
common with the people who populate Lake Wobegon. He is
genuinely self-effacing and modest; Keillor described him as the "shy
person's Justice." Those of us who have served with him on the Court
10. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
11. Id. at 381.
12. 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991).
13. Id. at 2645.
14. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
15. GARRISON KEILLOR, LAKE WOBEGON DAYS 1 (1985).
16. Id. at 6.
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will miss his legal learning, his devotion to his craft, and his many
contributions to our deliberations in Conference.
TRIBUTE TO JUSTICE
HARRY A. BLACKMUN
RUTH BADER GINSBURG*
I write in praise of a gentle man, my dear colleague, Harry A.
Blackmun, who taught us all that a person may grow in wisdom and
humanity more than a generation past 63.
Hundreds, perhaps thousands of pages have been written about
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe v. Wade,' a decision he was
assigned to write for a Court that divided 7-2. I suspect, however, that
he found far less troublesome, and relished much more, an assign-
ment given him two years later, Stanton v. Stanton.2 In that case,
Justice Blackmun wrote, for a Court divided 7-1, that a state could not
mandate parental support for sons until age 21, but for daughters,
only until age 18. This is what he said:
[A] child, male or female, is still a child. No longer is the female
destined solely for the home and the caring of the family, and only
the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas . ... If a
specified age of minority is required for the boy in order to assure
him parental support while he attains his education and training,
so, too, it is for the girl. To distinguish between the two on
educational grounds is to be self-serving: if the female is not to be
supported as long as the male, she hardly can be expected to
attend school as long as he does, and bringing her education to an
end earlier coincides with the role-typing society has long im-
posed.3
Stanton v. Stanton typifies the Court's jurisprudence of the 1970s in
cases involving sex-based classifications;4 it is fitting that the writing
was done by a man who cherishes daughters fully as much as sons.
* Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
3. Id. at 14-15.
4. See also Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
692
HARRY A. BLACKMUN
I count it my great good fortune to have been appointed to the
Court while Justice Blackmun remained on the bench. We do not
always agree5 and we approach oral argument differently,6 but he has
been for me a model of the caring Justice. I join the legions who
applaud Harry A. Blackmun for "his integrity, his high sense ofjustice
and exemplification of decency, modesty and civility."7 Justice
Blackmun loves beautiful music and fine theater. May he and his
life's partner Dottie enjoy bright notes and pleasing scenes in the
years ahead.
5. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S._, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
6. Justice Blackmun asks fewer questions, but those he asks are gems. See, e.g., Transcript
of oral argument in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), Feb. 26, 1974, at 48-49.
7. See Presentation of Honorary Membership to Justice Harry A. Blackmun with remarks
by Barbara Paul Robinson and John D. Feerick, 49 The Record of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York 4, 5 (1994).
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WILLim J. BRENNAN, JR.*
"The life of the law," Holmes proclaimed in his most famous
aphorism, "has not been logic: it has been experience."' I do not
understand Holmes to have claimed that abstract legal doctrine is
irrelevant or unimportant in determining particular legal results; his
point was less controversial-that the development of the law is
inevitably influenced by
[t] he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, [and]
even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men ....
[The law] cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms
and corollaries of a book of mathematics.2
Justice Blackmun's jurisprudence has been marked by a similar
insight: that judging is much more than a process of pristine
deductive analysis; that compassion, wisdom, and common sense are
no less essential to the judicial role than thorough scholarship and
technical mastery of the law.
Justice Blackmun has eloquently expressed this notion in his
opinions, honestly acknowledging the inevitable limitations of mortal
judges, and at the same time exposing the cruel myth of law as
"mathematics"-the scientific application of legal "axioms and
corollaries," utterly divorced from consideration of its impact in the
real world on the lives of real people.' His separate dissent in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,4 from the
Court's rejection of a permanently injured child's claim that welfare
workers violated due process by recklessly placing him in the custody
* Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (retired).
1. OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEsJR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
2. Id.
3. Harry might not entirely approve of this analogy, he was graduated from Harvard in
1929 with an A.B. degree summa cum laude in mathematics.
4. 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
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of an abusive father, provides a striking example. Justice Blackmun
chided the majority for
purport[ing] to be the dispassionate oracle of the law, unmoved by
"natural sympathy." But, in this pretense, the Court itself retreats
into a sterile formalism which prevents it from recognizing either
the facts of the case before it or the legal norms that should apply
to those facts.'
Justice Blackmun observed that the Court's precedents left the
question open and suggested a "sympathetic" reading of the Due
Process Clause, "one which comports with dictates of fundamental
justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the
province of judging."'6 Justice Blackmun eloquently and succinctly
exposed the weakness of a formalistic reading of the other compo-
nent of the Fourteenth Amendment in his fine concurrence in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke:
In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.
There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally,
we must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare not-let the
Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.'
There is perhaps no better illustration ofJustice Blackmun's ability
to expose the pretense of legal formalism than his powerful dissenting
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick:
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, than Stanley
v. Georgia was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies,
or Katz v. United States was about a fundamental right to place
interstate bets from a telephone booth. Rather, this case is about
"the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men," namely, "the right to be let alone."'
Justice Blackmun insisted that Hardwick's claim should be analyzed
"in the light of the values that underlie the constitutional right to
privacy."9 Viewed in this light, the Court in Bowers "refused to
recognize ... the fundamental interest all individuals have in
controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others.""0
The constitutional protection of privacy was also at the center of
5. Id.
6. Id. at 213.
7. 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun,J., concurring).
8. 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (BlackmunJ., dissenting) (citing Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (BrandeisJ, dissenting)) (other citations omitted).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 206.
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Justice Blackmun's landmark opinion in Roe v. Wade," yet another
example of his gift for combining diligent scholarship with deep
concern for the human consequences of legal decisions.
Justice Blackmun's compassion and humility are by no means
evidenced solely in his judicial writings; they are the hallmark of the
man in all of his personal and professional relationships. Harry
Blackmun is much beloved by his family of current and former
secretaries, messengers, and law clerks-and by all of the Court
employees who have come to know him over the years-because he
cares deeply about people and takes a genuine interest in their lives.
Just how that enormous generosity of spirit translates into every
aspect of his work as a judge may have been best summed up by
Justice Blackmun himself. The public area of the Supreme Court
building includes a theater featuring a short film about the Court,
and that film includes a discussion among several Justices of the
Court's docket and its certiorari decisionmaking process. I pass the
theater every day, and I often hear the compassionate voice ofJustice
Blackmun, lamenting about
comments in the press that appear so frequently [that] many cases
are frivolous here. To the litigant, no case is frivolous. There's a
person behind every one of those cases. He deserves consideration
whether we grant certiorari or deny it.12
I have left for last some thoughts on Justice Blackmun's dissent
from the denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins,3 in which he
concluded that the death penalty cannot be imposed fairly and with
reasonable consistency, as required by the Constitution. 4 I have
recently written on Justice Blackmun's views at some length;" but I
want to amplify two points that I believe are extremely important.
The first is thatJustice Blackmun's position cannot fairly be described
as an unreasoned personal reversal, or even a departure from the
capital punishment jurisprudence of the Court. As a former clerk of
Justice Marshall's has pointed out:
[T]he Court's 1976 opinions approving several capital schemes
were in an important sense provisional. They were based to an
unusually significant degree on specific empirical claims about the
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. THIs HONORABLE COURT (WETA 1987).
13. 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
14. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); cf McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,
248 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15. WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., Neither Victims NorExecutioners, 8 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 1 (1994).
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possibility of reliable and evenhanded administration of the death
penalty.1
6
Justice Blackmun's "reversal" was based on the realization that the
system of capital punishment that actually exists in this country is not
administered in a reliable and evenhanded manner.17 Indeed, to
make my second point, Justice Blackmun's Callins dissent is only the
latest example of his great gift for combining rigorous legal reasoning
and human compassion, for demonstrating the courage to follow his
convictions and the humility to recognize his fallibility.
The nation owes Justice Blackmun an enormous debt of gratitude.
He will be sorely missed. But our loss is his family's gain; Dottie and
their daughters are no doubt thrilled at the prospect of spending
more time with the Justice after he steps out from under the crushing
hours that his tireless work ethic has always demanded. I share that
sentiment myself, and I wish my dear friend Harry and his family
good health and great happiness in the years to come.
16. Jordan Steiker, The Long Road Up from Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall and theDeath Penalty,
71 TEX. L. REv. 1131 (1993).
17. See Brennan, supra note 15, at 1-4.
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BYRON WHITE*
Justice Blackmun has had a long and illustrious judicial
career, first on the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and
then twenty-four years on the Supreme Court. His presence and
influence on the Court are very evident from the many important
opinions that he has authored. I enjoyed sitting with him over
the years. I wish him well, and I suspect that he will neither be
silent nor idle in his retirement.
* Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (retired).
JUSTICE HARRY BLACKMUN:
SOME PERSONAL NOTES
RICHARD S. ARNOLD*
On April 6, 1994, Justice Harry A. Blackmun announced his
decision to retire as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Obviously this was an event of profound national
significance. Justice Blackmun's voice on the Court has been
uniquely one of conscience, calling us all to greater self-knowledge,
to face and extirpate those habits of our society that urgently need
correction. To assess his record adequately, to express our gratitude
to him for his service, is not the work of a few days. It will take, and
it deserves, time and attention. My purpose in this short piece is
different: to offer a few personal observations about the Justice, his
approach to the work of judging, and his relationships with other
judges.
The Justice belongs, of course, to the whole country. But today I
claim him for the Eighth Circuit. I speak from the special perspective
of that Circuit, of which I have had the honor of being Chief Judge
for a little over two years. The Justice started with us right out of
Harvard Law School, as law clerk to Judge John B. Sanborn of
Minnesota, who had come on the Court of Appeals just that year,
1932. Judge Sanborn had been on the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota since 1925, and had never had a law
clerk. When Mr. Blackmun, as he then was, applied for a clerkship
(he had a job offer in Boston, but chose to return to Minnesota
because his father was ill), Judge Sanborn was reluctant: he had
proved he could get along without a law clerk, and he wanted to save
the United States some money. The applicant persisted, though, and
the judge agreed to hire him. The judge and the future Justice
worked together in what is now the Landmark Center in St. Paul, a
* ChiefJudge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
1. THEODOREJ. FErrER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
EIGHTH CIRcUIT 72 (1977).
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wonderful example of authentic historic preservation. The Justice
tells the story, prophetic perhaps in its meaning, of going to the judge
with a petition from an inmate protesting cruel prison conditions. "I
know, Harry," Judge Sanborn said, "but we can't do anything about
it." Years later, the Justice did do something about it.'
Judge Sanborn was a circuit judge in regular active service for
twenty-seven years. He decided to take senior status in 1959, and
summoned Mr. Blackmun, the General Counsel of the Mayo Clinic in
Rochester, Minnesota, to dinner. He told his old law clerk, who had
never sought the position, that he wanted his successor to be named
Blackmun. Judge Sanborn then wrote Lawrence E. Walsh, at the time
Deputy Attorney General, more recently in the news as independent
counsel in the Iran-Contra matter. Here is part of what the letter
said:
I sincerely hope, as I know you do, that political considerations will
not offensively enter into the selection of a successor. If they
should, there might be no vacancy to fill.'
The story is that Judge Sanborn really meant this: "Appoint Harry
Blackmun, or there will be no appointment to make." In any case,
the desired effect did follow. President Eisenhower appointed Harry
Blackmun a United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, and
he took his seat on November 4, 1959.4
More than ten years later, after Justice Fortas resigned, two
nominations by President Nixon-Judge Clement Haynsworth and
Judge G. Harrold Carswell-failed. Someone of unimpeachable
integrity and legal ability was needed, and the President chose Judge
Blackmun, who has ever since gloried in referring to himself as "Old
No. 3," the President's third choice. He became an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States on June 9, 1970.'
More to the point for purposes of my present focus, the Justice also
became Circuit Justice for the Eighth Circuit. Circuit Justices have
certain formal duties, like ruling on stay motions which come from
the Court of Appeals for their circuit, or from state courts geographi-
cally within the circuit. They also have a less formal role, and here
Justice Blackmun has excelled. He has attended all but two of the
Circuit Judicial Conferences during my 14 years on the Court of
2. SeeJackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
3. Letter from The HonorableJohn B. Sanborn to Lawrence E. Walsh (Feb. 21, 1959) (in
John B. Sanborn file, Department of Justice appointment files, Federal Personnel Records
Center, St. Louis, MO) quoted in FETrE supra note 1, at 73.
4. FETTER, supra note 1, at 93.
5. FrrER, supra note 1, at 73.
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Appeals, and would have been with us both of those times if
circumstances had not made his presence impossible. The Justice
always delivers the climactic address of the Conference, an occasion
not missed by a one of the several hundred judges and lawyers in
attendance. These occasions are instructive-he goes through the
docket for the Supreme Court Term just concluded, paying special
attention to cases from our circuit that the Court has reviewed, and
taking pains to be kind to our several faults. ("They don't grant cert.
to affirm," as the saying goes.) These addresses are spiced with
humor, one might almost say with mischief. The Justice is wont to
say, in a crowded room freely open to reporters, "Now, this is off the
record," and then he serves up a few tantalizing tidbits that, one
suspects, he knows will be reported. He is a man of quiet and
effective humor. The occasions have also been, at times, emotional.
Justice Blackmun knows his history and his human nature, he is
deeply patriotic, and he is a faithful disciple of the better side of the
law. Not a few times he has brought tears to my eyes. He is more
than a Circuit Justice to us. He is our shepherd, with an almost
ecclesiastical devotion to our welfare.
So I think first, and with pride, ofJustice Blackmun as a man of the
Eighth Circuit. We are all proud of him, and proud that he still
claims us as his own. I think of him also as a man with a special place
in his heart for Arkansas. One of his best friends on our Court was
Pat Mehaffy of Little Rock, Arkansas, who came on the Court in 1963
and was Chief Judge in 1973 and 1974.6 Judge Mehaffy (I recount
this history on the authority ofJustice Blackmun himself) mentioned
Judge Blackmun to Senator John L. McClellan after the Carswell
defeat in 1970, and it was Senator McClellan who most forcefully
brought the then circuit judge to the attention of President Nixon.
The Justice, partly for this reason perhaps, has a soft spot in his heart
for Arkansas. She is a small state, but there are those who love her,
7
and Harry Blackmun is prominent among them. He maintained for
years his close friendship with Chief Judge and Mrs. Mehaffy, and,
after that, with many others of the bench and bar of this Southern
outpost of the circuit. Just two years ago, though at the tail end of an
illness, the Justice came with Mrs. Blackmun to the Law School of the
University of Arkansas at Fayetteville. It was my good fortune to be
with the Blackmuns for two days there and to see first-hand how
6. FLrrR, supra note 1, at 74-75.
7. My apologies to Daniel Webster. See 15 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL
WEBSTER 11-12 (J. McIntyre ed., 1903) (recounting argument of counsel in Dartmouth College
v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)).
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gracious they were to faculty, students, and citizens. In fact, I had the
honor of helping to introduce the Justice before his principal address
(delivered, by the way, complete with slides). I take the liberty now
of repeating a little of what was said then-quoting, as it were, from my
favorite authority: myself.
I think of certain salient qualities in Justice Blackmun's work and
person. First, he is painstakingly, maybe sometimes even painfully,
fair. He is a real craftsman, careful but not pedantic. His work is in
the tradition of that famous dictum ofJudge Learned Hand: "[I] t is
as craftsmen that we. get our satisfactions and our pay."' I am
reminded, too, of Justice Holmes's advice: Our task is "to hammer
out as compact and solid a piece of work as one can, to try to make
it first-rate, and to leave it unadvertised."9 Perhaps this is one of the
reasons forJustice Blackmun's affection for tax cases, an affection not
shared, it seems, by all of his colleagues. In tax matters, precision is
important, and so is clarity. These qualities the Justice possesses in
abundance.
Second, Justice Blackmun has shown a willingness to change. I like
to quote two rather different authorities on this subject. It was Justice
RobertJackson of whom it was said, when he changed his mind about
some legal propositions, that "it showed that he hasn't stopped
thinking." And John Henry Cardinal Newman made a really wise
observation when he said, "to improve is to change, and to be perfect
is to have changed often." Whether Justice Blackmun has changed
often enough to be perfect is a question I will leave to others. But
changed he certainly has, and in important ways. The most recent
example is his much-noted change of heart with respect to the
constitutionality of the death penalty. ° Whether he was right in
1994, and wrong in Furman v. Georgia," is for others to
judge-certainly not the purview of judges of inferior courts. The
point is that the Justice was not afraid to change, and, what is more,
was not afraid to admit publicly that he had changed and to explain
why. This is maturity, not vacillation. The law does not always stay
the same, nor does one's view of it necessarily remain fixed.
Consistency is a virtue, but not the only virtue. Especially in matters
of constitutional interpretation, it may be more important to be right
8. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 77 (1958).
9. Oliver W. Holmes, 77Te Class of'61, inTHE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 94 (Richard A. Posner ed.,
1992).
10. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1128 (1994) (Blackmun,J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
11. 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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than to be consistent, and Justice Blackmun has been unremitting in
his pursuit of what is right.
Third, the Justice has integrity, perhaps the most important quality
of a judge, or of any public servant. His word is good. He does not
misrepresent his own mind. He forms his conscience carefully and
then sticks to it. This is not done self-consciously or, maybe, even
consciously at all. It is an innate, instinctive trait. For judges, whose
results and reasoning are often questioned, and rightly so, their own
integrity is the only complete defense. I like to quote Horace, maybe
the greatest Latin poet:
Integer vitae scelerisque purus
Non eget Mauris jaculis nec arcu.
If readers will not feel that their intelligence is being insulted, I will
supply my own free translation: "One who has integrity and is free of
fault has no need of weapons of war." Fortunately, Supreme Court
justices have not needed weapons of war. The attacks they suffer are
(usually) verbal, not physical, but they are, I suspect, no less vexing.
Justice Blackmun need not fear such attacks. His life and work need
no defense except his own manifest integrity. He needs no other
weapons.
Fourth, the justice is unfailingly considerate. Here I will be
pardoned, I hope, if I recount a personal incident. I had the
misfortune (you will understand why I use this word in a moment) of
writing the opinion for the Court of Appeals in National Bank of
Commerce v. United States.'2 I wrote the opinion while on vacation in
St. Kitts, an island in the Caribbean. I was quite proud of it, perhaps
too proud. I finished it in the middle of the night, having taken my
own index cards with case abstracts with me (not being able to face
a vacation without the law). Some time later, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari on petition of the United States. Still later, on one
morning in June, at the end of the Court's Term, my secretary came
to tell me that Justice Blackmun was on the line to speak to me. I
picked up the phone, and it was indeed the Justice, not a member of
his staff, but the Justice himself. He told me that that day he had
announced the opinion of the Court in United States v. National Bank
of Commerce,3 and that the Court had reversed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals. He was kind enough to add that the vote was five
to four, indicating that I had not been wholly wrong. This was an
uncommonly gracious thing to do, and quite rare, so far as I know,
12. 726 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1984), rv'd, 472 U.S. 713 (1985).
13. 472 U.S. 713 (1985).
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but it made me understand that part of greatness is a sort of
deference to those under oneself. This same quality has shown
through in all of the Justice's dealings with the judges and lawyers of
this Circuit. He is, above all, considerate, and when his duty is to
reprove, he does it gently.
So Justice Blackmun leaves the Court. He did not have to go. He
was in good health and spirits and could have stayed. He is going
because'he has decided it is time, a decision that only he can make.
He takes with him the love and respect of all of the judges and
lawyers of the Eighth Circuit. I will add a selfish note: I have told the
Justice that I never wish to convene a Judicial Conference of the
Eighth Circuit without his presence, and that he has a standing
invitation to sit with us any time he wishes. So maybe his career will
come full circle, and he will find himself again a judge of the Eighth
Circuit.
TRIBUTE TO HARRY A. BLACKMUN,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A.M. KEH*
Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun has served the nation well
these last thirty-five years. Born in southern Illinois in 1908, Justice
Blackmun spent most of his first sixty-two years in Minnesota. After
graduating from high school in St. Paul, he attended Harvard
University on a scholarship, graduating summa cum laude in
mathematics in 1929. He then entered Harvard Law School,
graduating in 1932. After law school, Justice Blackmun returned to
St. Paul and clerked for United States Circuit Court Judge John B.
Sandbom, whom he succeeded in 1959. He left the clerkship in 1933
to teach at the Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul-former Chief
Justice Warren Burger's alma mater. After a year of teaching, Justice
Blackmun went into private practice for 16 years. He married
Dorothy E. Clark in 1941 and they were blessed with three remarkable
daughters. In 1950 he became legal counsel for the famed Mayo
Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. In 1959, President Eisenhower
appointed Justice Blackmun to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. In 1970, President Nixon elevated Justice Blackmun
to the Supreme Court.
I first met this remarkable friend in 1955 when he offered me ajob
as his legal assistant at the Mayo Clinic. No young lawyer just
mustered out of the United States Marine Corps could have had a
wiser and more understanding mentor.
Justice Blackmun fits few of the stereotypes of American legal or
judicial giants. He was not a trial lawyer or a lawyer active in politics
and he did not have a bold or extremely outgoing personality. He
was not arrogant and was not blessed with an effortless pen or a biting
tongue. Today, as in 1955, he remains a modest, self-effacing,
* ChiefJustice, Minnesota Supreme Court.
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sensitive, articulate, and disciplined legal practitioner. It is a political
miracle he ever became a federal circuit judge and a justice of the
United States Supreme Court.
As counsel for the Mayo Clinic and as a federal judge, he may have
had more influence on the medical profession than if he had been a
doctor, a profession he seriously considered while attending Harvard
University. At Mayo he observed the long educational and ethical
road traveled by the men and women who treat the sick and dying.
He has always had, and I quote, "a sympathetic attitude toward the
medical profession and for the medical mind." In his many opinions
concerning medical matters, he has tried to allow doctors to practice
medicine without undue state influence and to allow patients
autonomy and privacy.
No federal judge in our lifetime has been subject to harsher
criticism than Justice Blackmun since he spoke for the Court in Roe
v. Wade. Whether one agrees with this decision or not, it has fueled
a continuing debate concerning the proper function of our Supreme
Court in the nation's constitutional system. Reading his opinions
helps all of us understand his vision of the constitutional promise of
privacy. These opinions attempted to set out the scope of govern-
mental intrusion into our intimate sexual and social relationships,
bodily integrity, and personal choices. They are the writings of a
thoughtful person unafraid to show his anguish and doubt. The
opinions are always scholarly and thorough, and they mirror the
continuing evolution of his mind and spirit.
The right to privacy may be a central constitutional issue in the
coming decades. With the enormous changes in science and
technology and the immense growth of governmental power, this
constitutional concept may be one of the essential legal and social
glues that holds together the nation-a nation fast becoming one of
the most diverse on this small globe in terms of religious, racial, and
ethnic makeup.
I will always remember his words in the Thornburgh opinion: "Our
cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise
that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely
beyond the reach of government. That promise extends to women,
as well as to men."1
Few of us have the opportunity to know a person of such decency,
common sense, and intellectual capacity. His words will be missed.
1. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,771
(1986).
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MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN: REFLECTIONS
FROM THE COURS MIRABEAU
PAUL R. BAJER*
Main Street in the old quarter of Aix-en-Provence, France, is the
Cours Mirabeau, a golden archway of Platanes trees and mossy
fountains. At one end stands the statue of the good Roi Ren~e, who
was loved in his day for his kindness, his wisdom, his good works.
I recall Bastille Day, 1986, the summer of the dissent in Bowers v.
Hardwick, Justice Blackmun's ringing plea for human dignity and for
freedom to differ in matters that count most. Harry and Dottie
Blackmun were lost in a faceless crowd that watched fireworks explode
emphemeral streams of red, white, and blue in the nighttime sky
above the Grande Fontaine d'Aix. This was the summer the French
press and Le Monde laughed at the spectacle of police invading an
American citizen's bedroom.2
Our paths crossed that summer at Aix-Marseille-lll University, its
Faculti de droit, the school of Portalis:
[B]ut there must be a body of case law. In the host of subjects that
make up civil matters, the judgments of which, in most cases,
require less an application of a precise provision than a combina-
tion of several provisions leading to the decision rather than
containing it, one cannot dispense with case law any more than he
* George M. ArmstrongJr., Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. Judicial Fellow, Supreme Court of the United States, 1975-76. Editor, MR. JUSTICE
AND MRS. BLACK: THE MEMOIRS OF HUGO L BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK (Random House
1986).
1. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2. Justice Blackmun made good use of his summer exposure to the French language, and
to Le Monde, on a later legal occasion, The Haitian Refugee "refoulei' Case, viz.:
It thus is no surprise that when the French press has described the very policy
challenged here, the term it has used is "refouler." See, e.g., Le bourbier haitien, Le
Monde, May 31-June 1, 1992 ("[L]es Etats-Unis ont d6cid de refouler directement les
rdfugibs recueillis par la garde cotire." (The United States has decided [de refouler]
directly the refugees picked up by the Coast Guard)).
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2569 (1993) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
My French colleague Alain Levasseur, who grew up outside Paris and who reads LeMonde, tells
me thatJustice Blackmun got it right in this Haitian "refouWer' case.
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can dispense with legislation.... It is for experience gradually to
fill up the gaps we leave. The Codes of nations are the fruit of the
passage of time, but prperly speaking, we do not make them.3
Or in Harry A. Blackmun's own prophetic words: "Of course, times
are different in 1970 than they were 200 years ago. No body of men
200 years ago could determine what our problems are today. That is,
I suppose, what we have courts for,... to construe the Constitution
in the light of current problems."4
Mr. Justice Blackmun's Bakke dissent quotes a similar thought, the
words of Chief'Justice Marshall: "'In considering this question, then,
we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding."
5
We were together at Aix teaching a course on Constitutional
Interpretation, with a subtitle drawn from a little book by a great
French law teacher and jurist, Franiois G6ny: Les Procidis d'Elaboration
du Droit Civi4 a lecture made by Grny at Nancy in 1910. I sensed a
link between G~ny's Mithode-his idea of "libre recherche scientifiqud' in
judicial handling of a Code--and Justice Blackmun's workways on
the Court, his handling of what he characterized before the Senate
Judiciary Committee as the "magnificent instrument" of the Bill of
Rights.7 His painstaking researches at the Mayo Clinic on the
3. PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE ON THE PROJET OF CGvtL CODE (1800) (M. Shael Herman
trans.), in Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 762, 772-73 (1969).
4. Hearing Before Comm. on the Judiciay, United States Senate on the Nomination of Hary A.
Blackmun, of Minnesota, to be AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 35 (1970) [hereinafter Blackmun Hearings] (statement of Judge Blackmun).
5. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Opinion of Blackmun,
J.) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)).
6. FRANCOIS G9NY, MtrHODE D'INTERPRErATION ET SOURCES EN DRorr PRIVE POSmF (Paris,
1899) (Ernest Bruncken trans.), repinted in part in 9 SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 1, 46 (1917).
See generally Jaro Mayda, Gony's Mithode After 60 Years: A Critical Introduction, in FRAN.oiS GfNY,
MtrHODE D'INTERPRETATION Ex SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF, at v (Louisiana State Law
Institute trans., 2d ed. 1954).
7. Blackmun Hearings, supra note 4, at 44 (statement ofJudge Blackmun). Very early, in
his first law review article, The Marital Deduction and Its Use in Minnesota, 36 MINN. L. REV. 50, 64
(1951), Harry Blackmun showed great promise working with a tool that ordinary minds would
find mundane:
The marital deduction is an apt and excellent tool for planning in Minnesota and
elsewhere but, as with any tool, it requires both the proper raw material of an adequate
fact situation and good craftsmanship. The lawyer can retain his assumed position as
the latter only by intelligent industry and a willingness to devote the time and energy
which is required to gain complete knowledge of the scope and capacities of this legal
tool and of its dangers and limitations .... Here is one of those rarely presented new
legal tools of real substance and of fairly general application.
Thirty years later, he would say of § 1983:
What a vibrant and exciting old statute it is. As Edmond Cahn so aptly observed,
"[F]reedom is not free." Whatever is the fate of § 1983 in the future, I do hope that
it survives both as a symbol and as a working mechanism for all of us to protect the
constitutional liberties we treasure.
Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain
Alive or Fade Away?, Seventeenth James Madison Lecture on Constitutional Law, New York
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Hippocratic Oath and on the history of abortion laws come to mind.
In his day, Mr. Justice Cardozo taught the connection between
Code and Constitution in his 1921 Storrs Lectures at Yale, in what has
come down to us as The Nature of the Judicial Process.
The same problems of method, the same contrasts between the
letter and spirit, are living problems in our own land and law.
Above all in the field of constitutional law, the method of free
decision has become, I think, the dominant one today. The great
generalities of the constitution have a content and a significance
that vary from age to age. The method of free decision sees
through the transitory particulars and reaches what is permanent
behind them. Interpretation, thus enlarged, becomes more than
the ascertainment of the meaning and intent of the lawmakers
whose collective will has been declared. It supplements the
declaration, and fills the vacant spaces, by the same processes and
methods that have built up the customary law.'
Each generation must discover old truths for itself. Mr. Justice
Blackmun has proved himself a worthy successor to Justice Cardozo,
whose seat-that of Joseph Story, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, Felix
Frankfurter, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,-"H.A.B." has adeptly
filled for twenty-four years.
Aix-en-Provence is a serene setting of sunshine and of herbs, an
ancient Roman outpost of warm springs for the troops. And all the
while the Jurisconsults laid down their regulae iuris at Rome: "Exfacto
jus oritur. That ancient rule must prevail in order that we may have
a system of living law."9 Justice Blackmun, like Louis Brandeis before
him, has kept a keen eye on the facts as he has given voice to the
living law of the Constitution.
The Justice returned to Aix the summer of his Casey dissent,"0 slip
opinions in hand, with Dottie-"Miss Clark," as the Justice sometimes
University School of Law, November 14, 1984, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 29 (1985) (quoting THE
GREAT RIGHTS 11 (E. Cahn ed. 1963)).
8. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (1921). Justice
Blackmun quoted Cardozo's thought, "The great generalities of the constitution have a content
and a significance that vary from age to age," in his Bakke opinion. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407.
Although he has said of himself, "I'm not a 'jurisprude.' I couldn't be an expert in
jurisprudence ifI wanted to be,"John A.Jenkins, A Candid Talk withJusticeBlackmun, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 61, Harry Blackmun, under the watchful eye of Professor
Norval Morris, has co-moderated the Aspen Institute Seminar onjustice and Societyfor fourteen
years. I was privileged to attend the latest installment, during the summer of 1993, and I have
no doubt that Harry Blackmun is a reflective thinker about the nature ofjustice, with his feet
firmly on the ground: "I get disturbed when we have a case that goes off on theory and does
injustice to the litigant. I think we're there to try to do justice to him as well as to develop a
great, overlying cloud of legal theory." Id.
9. Adams v. Tanner, 240 U.S. 590, 600 (1917) (MR.JUSTIcE BRANDEIS, dissenting).
10. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2843 (1992) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
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calls her-and their daughter Nancy joining the students in class.
Harry A. Blackmun's quiet voice, his restrained passion, his earnest
conviction, his common touch-all added life to our learning. "I think
that we should pursue justice," he told the students. "Some of us
anyway, on the Supreme Court, ought to keep justice in mind, if not
constantly every once in a while at least."
I've done it in the abortion cases when I speak of, "There is
another world out there," which I think we should bear in mind.
There is a person behind every case, usually a "little person," as I
describe it, who needs attention and consideration rather than a
legal theory of what is proper and what is right for all of us in the
long run. I think cases involve people. And that they deserve a
distinctive judgment, as well as the law itself.1'
We were told by Nancy what a great sacrifice to family is the grind of
the Court. "He hardly sees his grandchildren."
What especially sticks in my mind isJustice Blackmun's teaching us
that the work of the Court-'Your Supreme Court"-is an inescapably
human enterprise, with its ups and downs, its competing intellectual
personalities, its fray Term after Term. "One is locked in combat
down there."12
For two summers, then, we talked in France of the timeless craft of
judicial interpretation of written texts, from Napoleon's Code to
America's Constitution, aside the aged fountains of Aix where Portalis
played as a little boy. 'We cannot live with original intent," he told
his Cours Mirabeau students.
Gaps are inevitable; judicial choice is inescapable. Whether we will
have more or less liberty, more or less equality, always depends on the
workways of the judge. "There is no guarantee of justice except the
personality of the judge."13 This from Eugen Ehrlich, another
reflection from the Contintent.
11. The quotations, and others in text, are taken from the transcript of the sound
recordings of our Aix 1992 classes. Tape of LSU Law Center Summer Program (July 6-9, 1992,
Aix-en-Provence, France) (recorded with Justice Blackmun's permission) [hereinafter Aix-'92
Trans.] (copy on file with author).
12. Justice Blackmun made this remark while teaching a special Saturday morning
Constitutional Law class, with Dottie listening in, at LSU Law Center, March 9, 1985, recorded
with the Justice's permission (transcript on file with author). And the combat continues:
Today we are faced with the question whether the Equal Protection Clause forbids
intentional discrimination on the basis of genderjust as it prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race. We hold that gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy forjuror
competence and impartiality.
J.E.B. v. T.B., No. 92-1239, 1994 WL 132232 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1994) (Blackmun,J,, for the Court;
ScaliaJ.,joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and Thomas,J., dissenting).
13. EUGEN EHRLICH, FREIE RECHTSFiNDUNG UND FREIE REcHTSWISSENCHAFr (Leipzig, 1903)
(Ernest Bruncken trans.), reprinted in part in 9 SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD, supra note 6, at 47,
65.
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We all knowJustice Blackmun's DeShaney dissent, spoken from the
heart for all America to hear: "Today, the Court purports to be the
disspassionate oracle of the law, unmoved by 'natural sympathy.' But,
in this pretense, the Court itself retreats into a sterile formalism .
.", This is notJustice Blackum's way to interpret the "broad and
stirring clauses" of the Constitution:
On the contrary, the question presented by this case is an open
one, and our Fourteenth Amendment precedents may be read
more broadly or narrowly depending upon how one chooses to
read them. Faced with the choice, I would adopt a "sympathetic"
reading, one which comports with dictates of fundamental justice
and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the
province ofjudging.15
And what of Justice Harry Blackmun viewed from this side of the
Atlantic? I have read Justice Brennan's magnificent tribute to Harry
A. Blackmun:
Above all, Justice Blackmun's vision focuses upon human de-
tails-on the problems and worries and predicaments of individu-
als-and this has been the hallmark not only of his approach to
constitutional cases but of his interaction with the world around
him. This practical yet compassionate view has added scope to the
Court's work .... 16
And Erwin Griswold has solidly underscored Harry Blackmun's
wisdom and courage."7 I'm sure The American University Law Review's
symposium of salutes, which I am privileged to join, will be followed
by many more to come.
I would add only a few personal observations, aimed at plucking a
Spring '94 crocus for Minnesota's "shy person's Justice,""8 and for
"Miss Clark," Dorothy Clark Blackmun, the Justice's conscience in our
classroom. "Harry, you haven't answered the question."
I remember our first conversation, the day after I heard the
DanforthV9 opinion announced in Court. Only because I was about
to return home to teaching after my year as a Judicial Fellow did I
make bold to say a word. The Justice was at breakfast with his clerks,
as always, at 8:05 a.m. in the Court's cafeteria. Quickly passing the
table, I mentioned that I admired his opinion in Danforth. TheJustice
14. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989).
15. Id. at 212-13.
16. WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Hany A. Blackmun, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. xi.
17. Erwin N. Griswold, Tribute, 1990 ANN. SuRv. AM. L xvii.
18. This is fellow Minnesotan, ofPowdermilk Biscuit fame, Garrison Keillor's aptdescription
of the Justice, quoted in Glen Elasser, CourtingJustice, CI. TRIB.,June 6, 1990, § C, at 1.
19. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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called me back: "Professor, what part of the opinion did you like?"
I didn't think he knew I existed at the Court, much less that I was a
law teacher. But he pays attention to other lives, I now know. I had
done my homework. I recited from the Justice's mathematical
breakdown: "IV-E." This was the hard, saline amniocentesis issue in
the case. Justice Blackmun, as he has done for countless others,
invited me to sit down at the table and join the dialogue. I won-
dered, "What am I doing here?" Justice Blackmun felt exactly the
same way "the day the load of bricks fell on me":
I'll never forget the 9th day of June, 1970, when I was sworn in.
Immediately after the swearing in we went into "the Conference,"
so called. I walked into that room and there was Hugo Black,
William 0. Douglas, William J. Brennan, Jr., John Marshall
Harlan-and I said to myself "What am I doing here."2"
I sat down and told the Justice I thought the Court was wise in
Danforth not to allow itself to be hoodwinked even by a sovereign state
legislature-never mindJustice Byron White's biting criticism that the
Court had made itself the Nation's ex officio Medical Review Board.
I remember showing a visitor the nooks and crannies of the Court;
this was one of my duties as a Judicial Fellow. We stopped short at
the Justices' Library, a quiet retreat that Justice Blackmun made his
own. We watched the Cardigan Justice erase a word or two from a
draft opinion. He penciled in a replacement, picked up the page,
leaned back, and subjected the revision to his angle of vision. Years
later, I would learn at Aix:
What I like most of all is writing opinions. There isn't any question
about this in my mind. I don't know whether it's because it's a
quiet enterprise or whether it's because it gives you a chance to
think a little bit and the like. Writing opinions is a play with words.
One can work on them, change them, refine them. I suppose the
opinions that one writes are what he's remembered by.
Mr. Justice Blackmun is a jeweller of opinions. We left him
undisturbed at his quiet enterprise.
The Justice's sympathy for the little person is preserved in the U.S.
Reports, just as the good Roi Ren~e rests in bronze on the Cours
Mirabeau.
Beneath the surface, the roots of Harry Blackmun's empathy run
deep: "I dislike to talk about it, but I did not have very much to start
with .. . ."I' Christmas Eve 1931 was spent in New York City, with his
20. Aix-'92 Trans., supra note 11, at 40.
21. Blackmun Hearings, supra note 4, at 55 (statement ofJudge Blackmun).
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Law School roomate's family. Doctor Harry Emerson Fosdick invited
him to climb the bell tower of Riverside Church late at night:
I agreed. We ascended the long stair in the cold night and finally
reached the platform and looked out upon the lights of New York
City, up and down the Hudson and across the East River. It was an
impressive and beautiful sight. And yet Doctor Fosdick said:
'Young man, there is more misery under those lights this Christmas
than you will ever know." I have not forgotten.22
As a Justice, Harry Andrew Blackmun made it a point of duty to
rescue parties from anonymity by reciting their first, middle, and last
names, viz.: "Jose Chavez-Salido, Pedro Luis Ybarra, and Ricardo
Bohorquez are American-educated Spanish-speaking lawful residents
of Los Angeles County, California. Seven years ago, each had a
modest aspiration-to become a Los Angeles County 'Deputy
Probation Officer, Spanish-speaking.' 2  Countless other examples
of this unheralded Blackmun touch are in the Reports.
Mr. Justice Blackmun is a master of doctrinal exposition and of
tying up loose ends. His scholarship is enormous. Nowhere in the
briefs in United States v. Sioux Nation is the story told of "the Black
Hills of South Dakota, the Great Sioux Reservation, and a colorful,
and in many respects tragic, chapter in the history of the Nation's
West.' 24 Rather, we learn of the Fort Laramie Treaty, of the Powder
River War, and of the Sioux tribes, "led by their great chief, Red
Cloud," only through the empathy of Harry Blackmun's opin-
ion-painstakingly documented-for the Court.
Like other mortals, Justice Blackmun has changed his mind on vital
subjects when experience and further reflection move him to do so.
Joe Garcia's case comes to mind.' And then there is the death
penalty, Justice Blackmun's cri de caur the other day upon Bruce
22. HarryA. Blackmun, Remarks at the American Bar Association Prayer Breakfast in Dallas,
Tex. 10-11 (Aug. 12, 1979) [hereinafter ABA Remarks] (copy on file with Chambers ofJustice
Blackmun).
23. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 448 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Harold
Hongju Koh, who clerked for Blackmun during the Chavez-Salido Term, has poignantly captured
the spirit of his Justice as Harry Blackmun announced his dissent:
As the Justice spoke, I noticed that the spectators had become still, and were listening
intently. For them, the case had suddenly become real; the Supreme Court had become
a human institution. The concept of equal treatment for aliens had suddenly acquired a
human face.
Harold H. Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8
HAMLiNE L. Ray. 51, 104 (1985).
24. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 374 (1980). Justice Blackmun
has done the same thing for the Crow Nation, Chief Blackfoot, and the bed of the Big Horn
River. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 569 (1981) (BlackmunJ., dissenting in part).
25. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruling National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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Edwin Callins's petition:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machin-
ery of death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored-indeed,
I have struggled-along with a majority of the Court, to develop
procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the
mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather
than continue to coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level
of fairness has been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerat-
ed, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that
the death penalty endeavor has failed. 6
I have no doubt that Justice Blackmun has grown as a Justice over
the years, as he himself described the endeavor, and that he has
fulfilled his Aix hope:
I suspect that when one goes on the Supreme Court of the United
States his constitutional philosophy is not fully developed. When
one goes to Washington he has to develop a constitutional
philosophy. What does "equal protection of the laws" really mean?
And if one didn't grow and develop down there I would be
disappointed in that person as a Justice. I would hope that in 1992
almost 20 years after Roe against Wade that I have grown a little bit
in my constitutional philosophy and my constitutional resolution.
I call that growth, not change, and I hope I'm correct.
Like the Doctors Mayo in Medicine, Justice Blackmun in Law has
"loved the truth and sought to know it."27 He has judged faithful to
his own measure: "Must we not say that the law, in order to be true,
at least must 'establish Justice,' within the meaning of the Preamble
to the Constitution of the United States?" 28 And it is in the Pream-
ble thatJustice Blackmun finds "the basic prescription for the process
of balancing"2 9 that has been his hallmark all along: "to balance
value against value to determine in a given context which is to
prevail." ° This balancing, he has told us, "lies at the very heart of
26. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
27. Justice Blackmun explained:
Flanking the great stairs on the west side of the Supreme Court building in Washington
are two pedestals. On them are figures carved by the well-known sculptorJames Earle
Fraser. Another Fraser statue is in Rochester, Minnesota. It portrays the Doctors Mayo
in their surgical gowns. Beneath those figures are the words: "They loved the truth
and sought to know it."
Remarks of Hany A. Blackmun: Law Dedication Dinner, IowA ADvOcATE, Fall/Winter 1986-1987, at
15.
28. Id.
29. Remarks of Hary A. Blackmun: The Waterman Hall Addition Dedication, 30 ARK L. REV. vii,
xxi (1976).
30. Id.
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constitutional adjudication."1
Justice Blackmun has taken a quiver of arrows over the years. But
there is an arrow of a different sort-Holmes's conviction that "while
one lives there is neither logic nor joy in living languidly, that there
is duty and delight in hard fighting, that while it is well to hit the
mark, it is sometimes better to shoot an arrow into the sky if it takes
fire there .... "2
I like to think O.W.H., Jr., was a muse of sorts as Harry Blackmun
worked alone in the Justices' Library.3 3 "Only when you have worked
alone,-when you have felt around you a black gulf of solitude more
isolating than that which surrounds the dying man, and in hope and
in despair have trusted to your own unshaken will,-then only will you
have achieved." 4
This is enough, I trust, to show my high regard and affection for
Justice Blackmun. Paul Freund said of Brandeis that he was the
Court's Isaiah. Harry Blackmun's example of tenacity and of not
giving up; his willingness to innovate, not merely to imitate, and to
take the calculated risk; hisjoining in the fray; his moral courage; his
love-all remind me of the example of Ruth, as Harry Blackmun
described Ruth at an A.B.A. Prayer Breakfast, some fifteen years
ago.3
5
President Clinton has justly named Harry Blackmun as an ideal
Justice. And the President's suggestion that what is needed on the
Supreme Court is "somebody with a big heart"3 6 stems directly, I
believe, from Justice Blackmun's radiant example.
What is needed on the Court is character; learning, some of it
acquired; experience; hard work; and wisdom. Harry Blackmun's
example also shows us that human sympathy and compassion are vital
31. "Fashioning such accommodations between individual rights and the legitimate interests
of government, establishing benchmarks and standards with which to evaluate the competing
claims of individuals and government, lies at the very heart of constitutional adjudication."
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 549 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
32. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Anonymity and Achievement (1890), in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES
OFJUSTCE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 59, 61 (M. Dew. Howe ed. 1962).
33. Sometimes Holmes as Muse shows up injustice Blackmun's opinions. See, e.g., Lewis
v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 136 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("All rights tend to
declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme."); New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 759 (1971) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) ("Great cases like hard cases make bad law.").
In Lens,Justice Blackmun decried the Court's protecting profanity under the First Amendment
and "[t]he extreme to which we allow ourselves to be manipulated by theory extended to the
end of logic." Lewis, 415 U.S. at 136.
34. The Profession of the Law (1886), in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JUNIOR, SPEECHES 22, 24
(1891).
85. ABA Remarks, supra note 22.
36. Ruth Marcus &Joan Biskupic, Justice White to Retire After 31 Years, WASH. POST, Mar. 20,
1993, at Al (quoting President Clinton).
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in the work of the Court.
And so the Court's Nehemiah will come down from the wall. 7 He
has built well. His faith endures: "But the Court for me is a precious
institution, and, in my estimation, even a heroic one."3 8  Harry
Blackmun has added a humanity to Justice that is uniquely his own.
I sent up a telegram to "Old No. 3" on the faithful day, April 6,
1994:
"WE CANNOT LIVE OUR DREAMS. WE ARE LUCKY ENOUGH
IF WE CAN GIVE A SAMPLE OF OUR BEST, AND IF IN OUR
HEARTS WE CAN FEEL THAT IT HAS BEEN NOBLY
DONE."-O.W.H. to Boston Bar, 1900. THANK YOU FOR YOUR
COURAGE, YOUR WISDOM, YOUR SYMPATHY FOR "POOR
JOSHUA," YOUR HARD WORK. LOVE TO YOU AND DOTTIE.
Professor Baier, Kids, LSU. STOP
And even now my mind wanders back to our last class at Aix, to his
closing words: a favorite passage from William Penn, read with
poignancy by the Justice to the young people who gathered around
him. Harry Blackmun has walked humbly through life-and he has
shaped the cold corridors of the law-guided by these words: "I
expect to pass through life but once. If therefore, there be any
kindness I can show, or any good thing I can do to any fellow being,
let me do it now, and not defer or neglect it, as I shall not pass this
way again."
Mr. Justice Blackmun has given a sample of his best. It has been
nobly done.
37. "Perhaps far off in another Persia, or nearby, within all of us, is, hopefully, a bit of the
spirit of Nehemiah." Harry A. Blackmun, Remarks at the American Bar Association Prayer
Breakfast in Washington, D.C. 11 (Aug. 5, 1973) (copy on file with Chambers of Justice
Blackmun).
Will we be able to invoke the spirit of his day and of his people when under his
leadership they said "let us rebuild" and "let us start"? Will it be said of us that "with
willing hands" we "set about the good work"? 1:17-18. Will it be said of us that we "put
[our] hearts into [our] work." 4:6-9, and that we proceeded, when necessary, with a
weapon in one hand and a builder's tool in the other? Will it be said that, despite the
opposition of announced displeasure, accusation, redicule, anger, confusion,
infiltration, blandishment, threat, temptation, and those repeated invitations to come
down to the Plain of Ono and to delay and compromise and rationalize, we held steady
and built again?
Id.
38. Harry A. Blackmun, Remarks at Renaissance Weekend at Hilton Head, S.C. 21 (Dec.
31, 1992) (copy on file with Chambers ofJustice Blackmun).
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IT'S BEEN A GREAT RIDE: A TRIBUTE TO
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN
ALLAN GATES*
It is a great honor for me to participate in The American University
Law Review's tribute to Justice Blackmun. I do not propose to survey
Justice Blackmun's long list of judicial opinions. Scholars more
qualified than I have already started that task.' Nor do I claim any
measure of objectivity. Former law clerks are rarely impartial when
speaking of the judges with whom they have served; and I am
shamelessly partial when it comes to Justice Blackmun. I propose to
offer a few personal comments in hopes of suggesting why Justice
Blackmun inspires such widespread respect and heartfelt affection
among all those who have had the privilege of working with him.
Justice Blackmun offered me the opportunity to clerk in his
chambers twenty years ago this spring. I clearly remember my
interview. I was extremely nervous that morning. No one from my
law school had ever been offered a Supreme Court clerkship.
Although I had visited Washington, D.C. as a child, I had never been
* Partner, Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, Little Rock, Arkansas. Law clerk
for Justice Blackmun, 1974 Term. J.D., Vanderbilt School of Law, 1972; B.A., Yale University,
1969.
1. See, e.g., Richard S. Arnold, Mr. Justice Blackmun: An Appreciation, 8 Hamline L. Rev. 20
(1985); Randall P. Bezanson, Emancipation as Freedom in Roe v. Wade, 97 DICK. L. REV. 485
(1993); Randall P. Bezanson, Fault, Falsity and Reputation in Public Defamation Law: An Essay on
Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 105 (1985); Lynn E. Blais, Simple
Justice/Simple Murder Reflections on Judicial Modesty, Federal Habeas and Justice Blackmun's Capital
Punishment Jurisprudence, 97 DicK. L. REv. 513 (1993); Dan T. Coenen,JusticeBlackmun, Federalism
and Separation of Powers, 97 DICK. L. REV. 541 (1993); Pamela S. Karlan, Bringing Compassion into
the Province ofJudging. Justice Blackmun and the Outsiders, 97 DIcK. L. REV. 527 (1993); Harold H.
Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L.
REV. 51 (1985); Donald Lay, The Cases of Blackmun, J. on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit 1959-1970, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 2 (1985); William A. McDaniel, Jr., Public Trials, 8
HAMUNE L. REv. 127 (1985); Karen N. Moore, Justice Blackmun's Contributions on the Court: The
Commercial Speech and State Taxation Examples, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 29 (1985); Karen N. Moore,
Justice Blackmun and Preclusion in the State-Federal Context, 97 DicK. L. REV. 465 (1993); Mark C.
Rahdert, Preserving the Archives of Freedom: Justice Blackmun and First Amendment Protections for
Libraries, 97 DIcK. L. REV. 437 (1993); Diane P. Wood, Justice Blackmun and Individual Rights, 97
DIcK. L. REV. 421 (1993).
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inside the Supreme Court building. The scale and drama of the
building's architecture only heightened my anxiety. I was totally awed
by the prospect of meeting privately with ajustice of the United States
Supreme Court. As the hour for my interview approached, I became
confident that Justice Blackmun would probe with surgical precision
all of the weakest spots of my limited legal experience. I especially
feared that Justice Blackmun would quiz me on some aspect of tax
law, an area I knew he personally favored.
As events turned out, my fears regarding the interview were totally
unjustified. Justice Blackmun greeted me in his trademark cardigan
sweater. His gentle and unassuming personality immediately put me
at ease. Although Justice Blackmun enquired about my training and
experience, his questions were nothing like the interrogation I feared.
In fact, Justice Blackmun spent much of the time in the interview
explaining almost apologetically that the job could involve long hours
and weekend work. When he learned that I was married and had a
baby daughter, Justice Blackmun took special care to be sure that my
wife and I understood the demands the clerkship might place on our
lives. At the time, I was startled by Justice Blackmun's obvious
concern over the personal life of a prospective clerk. I assumed that
portion of my interview must have been unusual. Shortly after
starting work, however, it became clear to me that Justice Blackmun
had a solicitous interest in the personal lives of all who worked in his
chambers. In subsequent years, other Blackmun clerks have described
similar experiences in their interviews.
Towards the end of my clerkship, Justice Blackmun hosted a
reunion for all of his former clerks. The number of clerks attending
was surprisingly large because the group spanned Justice Blackmun's
eleven years of service on the Eighth Circuit, as well as four terms on
the Supreme Court. Despite the size of the group, Justice Blackmun
was clearly familiar with, and genuinely interested in, the details of all
of his former clerks' personal and professional lives. I was particularly
impressed by the joy Justice Blackmun took in discussing the well-
being and accomplishments of the clerks' spouses and children. In
subsequent years, my wife and I have had the pleasure of attending
several other Blackmun reunions. The number of former clerks has
grown steadily, and I am now counted among the old clerks from the
early years. Despite these changes, one aspect of the reunions has
remained constant. Justice Blackmun always remembers the last news
he had about careers, spouses, and children; and he inquires eagerly
about more recent developments.
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During the period of my clerkship, the popular press tended to take
Justice Blackmun's contributions to the Court lightly. The Justice was
labeled the "Minnesota Twin" by the media pundits, a vaguely
derogatory tag suggesting lack of independent values and undue
deference to Chief Justice Burger. In later years the press "discov-
ered" a new Justice Blackmun, a man of strong and independent
convictions.2 I suspect that many former Blackmun clerks shared my
amusement at the media's sudden discovery of the same Justice
Blackmun we had known all along, a gentle and compassionate man
who cared deeply about the impact of the Court's decisions. This is
not to say thatJustice Blackmun's views never changed. For example,
just this Term Justice Blackmun dramatically departed from his prior
decisions regarding the constitutionality of capital punishment.' In
doing so, however, Justice Blackmun did not change his personal
views on the death penalty-something he has always opposed.'
Instead, Justice Blackmun reevaluated his longstanding concerns
regarding the fairness, reasonability, and consistency with which death
sentences have been imposed in the two decades since his dissent in
Furman v. Georgia.' Justice Blackmun's willingness to reevaluate
positions and consider change is itself a consistent theme that is
evident throughout his judicial career.6 In response to questions in
his confirmation hearing about the importance of following judicial
precedent, Justice Blackmun stated that:
Precedent, I think, is a very valuable thing in the law. A lawyer has
to say, however, that it is not absolute. Judges, even Justices of the
Supreme Court, are human and I suppose attitudes change as we
go along.
I have made statements before that the overruling by the
Supreme Court of a prior precedent is not a matter always of great
alarm. I think this has happened throughout its history. As times
have changed, Justices have changed. People take a second look.7
2. See, e.g., Blackmun: Intellectual Openness Elicits Needed Respect forJudicial Process, NAT'L LJ.,
Feb. 18, 1980, at 18.
3. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
4. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 154 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated, 398 U.S. 262
(1970).
5. 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Callins, 113 S. Ct. at 1131-38.
See generally Blais, supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., Norman Dorsen, A Change InJudicial Philosophy?, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 18, 1985, at
13.
7. Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate on the Nomination of Harry A.
Blackmun, of Minnesota, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 43 (1970) (statement ofJudge Blackmun).
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Justice Blackmun works closely with his law clerks on almost all tasks
in the chambers, but there is one task he does not delegate. Justice
Blackmun reads his own mail, all of it, including the crank letters and
hate mail penned by those who disagree with his opinions. In recent
years Justice Blackmun has occasionally shared some of his "favorite"
letters in public speeches. Sometimes these letters are genuinely
amusing. Sometimes they are venomously hateful. For a long time
I could not understand why Justice Blackmun bothered to read this
junk mail. Now I believe I understand. I believe this practice reflects
his desire to remain in touch with public attitudes about the Court
and his fierce determination to avoid being insulated from any
criticism of his decisions, regardless of its character or source.
No tribute to justice Blackmun would be complete without mention
of Mrs. Blackmun and the Blackmuns' daughters, Nancy, Sally, and
Susie. Mrs. Blackmun and the daughters were a source of great
emotional support to Justice Blackmun, and they contributed
powerfully to the sense that all of the Justice's staff were part of one
large, extended family.
Justice Blackmun frequently reminds audiences that he was
President Nixon's third choice to fill the vacancy created by the
resignation ofJustice Fortas. His self-description as "Old Number 3"
is typical of Justice Blackmun's modesty, but it is historically mislead-
ing. Justice Blackmun's nomination admittedly followed unsuccessful
efforts to confirm two other nominees, Clement Haynesworth and G.
Harrold Carswell, but it is not accurate to suggest that being third
choice amounted to being third best. The contemporary record of
Justice Blackmun's confirmation clearly reflects that President Nixon
appointed Justice Blackmun because his professional credentials and
personal integrity were so exceptional that confirmation would be
assured despite the ill will that lingered in the Senate from the
previous confirmation fights.' Indeed, Justice Blackmun's creden-
tials were so exceptional that they neutralized questions that undoubt-
edly would have been raised against a less qualified candidate due to
8. For example, Senator Kennedy opened his questions atJustice Blackmun's confirmation
hearing with the following statement:
I want to extend a word of welcome to you, Judge Blackmun, as extended by my
colleagues here this morning. I believe your nomination vindicates what the Senate
did on the prior two nominations. In those two instances the important thing was not
so much that we rejected a particular man, but that we reestablished a very high
standard of excellence in terms of Supreme Court nominations, and certainly it would
appear to me that you meet this standard of quality, and I am pleased to welcome you.
Id. at 36 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); accord id. at 1 (statement of Sen. McCarthy); id. at 43
(statement of Sen. Bayh).
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the recent appointment of Warren Burger, a close friend and fellow
Minnesotan, to serve as Chief Justice.
During the year that I was privileged to work at the Court, the law
clerks had nicknames that were occasionally used in private conversa-
tions about the justices. I am ashamed to say that a few of these
nicknames were not particularly flattering. In retrospect the youthful
arrogance that we displayed in using such nicknames still astonishes
me. Justice Blackmun's sobriquet was "the Horse." I suppose that
name caught on because it had a certain rhythmic symmetry when
used with Justice Blackmun's first name. It also reflected the law
clerks' healthy respect forJustice Blackmun's prodigious capacity for
hard work. I was reminded of this nickname when I read Justice
Blackmun's remarks at the press conference announcing his retire-
ment. Justice Blackmun stated that, like Justice White, he felt his
tenure on the Supreme Court "had been a great ride."9 However
Justice Blackmun may view the matter, I am confident that it is we,
the American public, who have enjoyed a great ride. Justice
Blackmun has helped pull the Supreme Court's workload with
wisdom, integrity, and tireless energy for almost a quarter century. I
for one shall always be grateful to him for the great ride he has given
US.
9. See Statements on Retirement of Blackmunfrom Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at A12.
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ERWIN N. GRISWOLD*
The middle west has been the locus of twenty-eight justices and
chief justices.' This is somewhat more than one-fourth of the
members of the Court appointed from the beginning.
The first of these midwestern justices was John McLean. He was
born in northern New Jersey, and then made a number of moves to
Virginia and Kentucky, and finally to Ohio. As Burnett Anderson
states, "Throughout his career he was identified politically and
geographically with the West."2 McLean served on the Court from
1830 to 1861. He was followed by Justice Noah H. Swayne, likewise
from Ohio, who served from 1862 to 1881, and was succeeded by
Justice Stanley Matthews, from Ohio, who was a member of the Court
from 1881 to 1889, thus concluding fifty-nine years during which an
Ohio lawyer was a member of the Court, during nearly twenty-five of
which, from 1864 to 1888, the Court was led by Chief Justices Chase
and Waite, from Ohio.
With the benefit of hindsight, and necessarily as a matter of
personal choice, it may be said that of the twenty-eight midwestern
members of the Court, there were three who were particularly
outstanding. In chronological order, these were Justices Samuel F.
Miller,' from Iowa, who served from 1862 to 1890, the first John
* Senior Counsel, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue.
1. The allocation is necessarily arbitrary, and personal. As for "the middle west," I have
included the states which now constitute the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits. The personal
element in the allocation arises from the fact that in the early days, prospective justices were
born in, or worked in, the east, and then moved west, often making several moves. In more
recent years, they became known as residents of a particular state, but then came to Washington
in various administrative capacities, and, since they lived in the Washington area at the time of
their appointment to the Court, are sometimes listed as coming from the state of their residence
at the time of appointment, though their professional reputations were made elsewhere.
2. Burnett Anderson, John McLean, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED
BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1993, at 101, 101 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993).
3. See Charles E. Wyzanski, Mr. Justice Miller and the Supreme Court, 1862-1890, 53 HARV. L.
REV. 696, 696 (1940) (book review). Mr. Wyzanski wrote that this is "the best biography of an
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Marshall Harlan, from Kentucky, who served from 1877 to 1911, and
Justice Harry Andrew Blackmun, who was born in Illinois, but made
his basic professional career in Minnesota. He served on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from 1959 to 1970,
when he was appointed to the Supreme Court. As has been said,
Justice "Blackmun established himself as a justice who preferred to
focus on the pragmatic aspects of each case rather than the theoreti-
cal."4
The seat which Blackmun filled has been a distinguished one. It
was occupied by Joseph Story, Nathan Clifford, Horace Gray, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Benjamin N. Cardozo, and Felix Frankfurter,
among others. There is a curious analogy between Blackmun's
appointment and the appointment of Justice Joseph P. Bradley.
There were two vacancies at the time, and President Grant nominated
E. Rockwood Hoar, his Attorney General, and Edwin M. Stanton,
Secretary of War under Lincoln. Hoar encountered opposition in the
Senate, and Stanton, who had an easy confirmation, died four days
after being confirmed. Joseph P. Bradley was then nominated to fill
one of these seats and was easily confirmed.5 Thus, Bradley was, in
a sense, "No. 3," just as Blackmun designated himself when he came
to the Court following the rejection of Judges Haynesworth and
Carswell. Blackmun was unanimously confirmed by the Senate. He
showed "a populist concern for the 'little guy,' the person who would
be affected by the decision and whose modest circumstances may be
foreign to many members of the Court.,6
Blackmun will undoubtedly be most remembered because of his
painstaking opinion in Roe v. Wade,7 affirming a woman's right to
obtain an abortion during the first "trimester" of her pregnancy. This
decision was based heavily on conceptions of "a right to privacy" not
specified in any detail in the Constitution, and on the patient's right
American judge since Beveridge's Life ofJohn MarshalL" It proves the proposition "advanced by
ChiefJustice Chase andJohn F. Dillon that AssociateJustice Samuel Freeman Miller was 'beyond
question the dominant personality upon the bench whose mental force and individuality [were]
felt by the Court more than any other.'" Id. (quoting CHARLES FAiRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890, at 3 (1939)) (alteration in original).
4. Alan S. Mayans, Harry A. Blackmun, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED
BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1993, supra note 2, 486, 488.
5. Bradley dissented in the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), but one
day later he produced the Court's decision in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873),
which refused to apply the Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to require
the admission of a woman to practice law. In reaching this result, he relied on "the paramount
destiny and mission of woman," which, he said, was 'to fulfill the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator." BradweU, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141.
6. Mayans, supra note 4, at 488.
7. 419 U.S. 113 (1973).
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to seek and follow the advice of a physician-any physician. Subse-
quent thinking has led many minds to reach the conclusion that the
opinion might better have been based on the "equal protection"
clause.
When all is said and done, though, it may be that Blackmun's most
important opinion is the one that he wrote in concurring with others
to make up the majority in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke.' His opinion there contains this deeply perceptive message:
In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.
There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally,
we must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare not-let the
Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.'
There are many other illustrations of the careful, thorough, and
broad-visioned contributions of Justice Blackmun. He has written,
"There is another world 'out there,' the existence of which the Court,
I suspect, either chooses to ignore, or fears to recognize,"'" and he
has challenged the "comfortable perspective from which the Court
decreed that the effect of a regulation increasing the cost of an
abortion by forty dollars was insignificant."" As Alan S. Mayans has
written:
Blackmun's evolution shows a greater comfort with his role on the
nation's highest court and an increased willingness to allow his
personal character and his concern for fairness to influence his
decision-making. 2
Even as he has grown during his years on the Court, there can be
no doubt that the reputation of Harry Blackmun-"this gentle, careful
jusice"13-will continue to grow now that he has retired. He is, in my
view, one of the truly great justices of our time.
8. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
10. Beal v. Doe, 431 U.S. 439, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 494 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
12. Mayans, supra note 4, at 488.
13. Ellen Goodman, Blackmun the Emancipator, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1994, at 15.
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THE CASE OF THE SEVERED ARM:
A TRIBUTE TO ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
HARRY A. BLACKMUN
EDWARD P. LAZARUS*
During October Term 1988, when I served as one of Justice Harry
A. Blackmun's law clerks, it is fair to say that the Supreme Court
handed down more landmark decisions in more areas of law than in
any year since the New Deal watershed, 1937. Justice Blackmun
authored the opinion of the Court in several of the most heralded of
these cases: Mistretta v. United States,2 which upheld the constitution-
ality of the federal sentencing guidelines; County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, which re-examined the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence; and Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,4
which rejected an Eighth Amendment limit to punitive damages in
suits between private parties. The Justice also commanded the
nation's attention with a series of trenchant dissents whose passionate
phrases, such as "Poor Joshua!"5 and "the signs are evident and
ominous and a chill wind blows,"6 already have passed indelibly into
the lexicon of our legal culture.
* Law Clerk to Justice Blackmun, October Term 1988.
1. E.g. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 489 U.S. 469 (1989); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989);
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989);
Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989);
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., Inc.,
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
2. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
3. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
4. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
5. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., Inc., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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Yet, surprisingly, amid the giant sequoias of that term, a small
sapling of a dissent, six pages in Green v. Bock Laundry, Co.,7 an
obscure case interpreting Rule 609(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, stands out in my memory as perhaps the purest example of
Blackmunesque jurisprudence. The petitioner, Paul Green, was an
inmate at a county prison who, as part of a work-release program, had
obtained a job at a local car wash. On his sixth day of work, Green
reached into a large industrial dryer to stop the machine only to have
the dryer's heavy rotating drum catch his arm and tear it off. Green
sued Bock Laundry Co., the dryer's manufacturer, claiming that his
maiming had resulted from inadequate instruction about the
machine's operation and inherent dangerousness.
In anticipation of trial, Green filed a motion to prevent Bock
Laundry from impeaching his testimony by introducing evidence of
his felony convictions for burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary.
The trial judge denied the motion and, at trial, Bock Laundry did
indeed impeach Green as a convicted felon. The jury found for Bock
Laundry and Green appealed. He argued that the trial judge had
erred in denying his pre-trial motion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit summarily affirmed.8
When I started preparing a bench memo on the case for Justice
Blackmun, the issue seemed pretty cut and dried. Federal Rule of
Evidence 609(a) provided in relevant part: "For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted.., if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year... and
the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. . ...9
Read literally, the rule mandated the absurd and perhaps unconsti-
tutional result that a civil defendant could always impeach a civil
plaintiff with evidence of prior felony convictions, but not vice-versa.
Judges and scholars alike agreed that some other reading was
required. And among clerks at the Court, a consensus quickly
developed as to what that reading should be.
To a person, we concurred with the Court of Appeals that, based
on the available evidence of legislative intent and doing least violence
to the text of the Rule itself, the most appropriate alternative reading
was that the Rule's use of the word "defendant" should be limited to
7. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
8. 845 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1988). The Court of Appeals was following its precedent
established in Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985).
9. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (emphasis added).
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defendants in criminal cases. Accordingly, Rule 609(a) (1) should be
read to require the admission of felony convictions for the purpose
of impeachment regardless of prejudicial effect against every type of
witness except a criminal defendant. Under this interpretation, which
I dutifully recommended to justice Blackmun, Paul Green was flat out
of luck.
Conference days were remarkable in the Blackmun Chambers.
Around the Court a buzzer would sound indicating that the justices
had completed their deliberations. I would move to the doorway of
my office to watch their recessional down the long red carpet of the
south corridor. Most times that Term, Justice Blackmun and Justice
Brennan would walk together, slowly, as Brennan, who had been ill,
steadied himself on Blackmun's arm. They would pause before the
door to Brennan's chambers, framed against the light filtering in
from the courtyard outside. Their heads, inclined slightly, would
almost touch as they exchanged a few last words. After a moment,
the brotherhood would part and Justice Blackmun, lost in thought,
would complete his return journey, gliding wordlessly into his office,
gently shutting the door.
A few hours later Justice Blackmun would call his clerks into his
office to report on Conference. For the argued cases (as opposed to
the certiorari dispositions), the Justice would summarize the remarks
of each of the justices in order of their seniority. It was mesmerizing:
Blackmun's rich, gravelly voice rumbling through the comments of his
colleagues, punctuated occasionally by a sentence or two of brilliant
imitation that never failed to astonish and amuse.
When it came to his own contributions, the Justice played a cagey
game, but eventually we caught on. If he had adopted your recom-
mendation in a case, he always would make clear that his remarks at
conference had included the finer phrases from your bench memo.
On those agonizing occasions when Justice Blackmun disagreed with
a clerk's assessment of a case, he took a very different tack. When it
came time to reveal his position at Conference, he would simply
announce how he had voted and move swiftly on. The Justice never
once embarrassed one of us by dwelling on what had left him
unpersuaded.
On the day the Conference took up Bock Laundry, I remember
facing the Justice across his immaculate desk in the half light of a
winter afternoon as he started marching through the day's cases. In
deciding Bock Laundry, as I expected, three of the fourJustices senior
to Blackmun (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Marshall) had voted to affirm the Court of Appeals and interpret Rule
1994]
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609(a) (1) as requiring the admission of past criminal convictions
without consideration of prejudice except in the case of criminal
defendants. Justice Brennan, concerned about the legislative history
behind the Rule, was tentatively to reverse.
Turning to his own views, Justice Blackmun paused. He sighed,
deeply, almost achingly. "I voted to reverse," he said. Then,
immediately, he launched into an account ofJustice Stevens' remarks.
Stevens had voted to affirm as had Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy in turn. The final tally was 7-2.10
InJustice Blackmun's view, the judicial rewriting of Rule 609 (a) (1)
was not to be accomplished on the basis of an exhaustive search for
recondite snippets of legislative history to determine what Congress
might have intended with its ambiguous and perhaps even inadvertent
use of the word "defendant" in the Rule. A man had lost an arm.
And that man had been denied compensation almost certainly in part
because ajury had heard irrelevant and inflammatory evidence about
his criminal past.
For Justice Blackmun, as reflected in his dissent from Justice
Stevens' majority opinion, Bock Laundry was about Paul Green and the
unfairness he had suffered. If the Court was going to jury-rig some
cure for Congress' defective language, then Justice Blackmun was
"persuaded that a better interpretation of the Rule would allow the
trial court to consider the risk of prejudice faced by any party, notjust
a criminal defendant." That would "prevent similar unjust results
until Rule 609(a) is repaired, as it must be.""
"Neither result," Blackmun continued, "is compelled by the
statutory language or the legislative history, but for me the choice
between them is an easy one.... We cannot know precisely why the
jury refused to compensate [Paul Green] for the sad and excruciating
loss of his arm, but there is a very real possibility that it was influ-
enced improperly by his criminal record. I believe that this is not a
result Congress conceivably could have intended, and it is not a result
this Court should endorse.'
Justice Blackmun's Bock Laundry dissent, ultimately joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, brought Paul Green's face into focus.
In 1990, Congress amended Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)."3 It
10. Papers of Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall Box 552, Green v. Bork Laundry, Library
of Congress, Washington, D.C.
11. Green v. Bock Laundry, Co., 490 U.S. 504, 530-31 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 535.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 609(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
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codified justice Blackmun's version of how the Rule should have been
interpreted all along.
I have no doubt thatJustice Blackmun has been the most empathic
Justice in recent times, and very likely in the entire history of the
Court. He has been the justice most concerned with and most
understanding of the human drama behind the briefs and memoran-
da that flood his desk, the justice most appreciative that legal cases
arise from the unseen anguish of real people that the law can either
soothe or inflame, the justice most likely to weave silken threads of
sympathy across the too often present gap between "law" and 'justice."
The nation shall long be injustice Blackmun's debt for his insistent
reminders (as he wrote in another case) that "compassion need not
be exiled from the province ofjudging."14 Those of us who enjoyed
the extraordinary privilege of working for the justice are equally in his
debt for reminding us that the same holds true for the province of
life.
14. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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NORVAL MORIUS*
If I count correctly, for seventeen years Justice Blackmun has spent
two weeks every summer at the Aspen Institute, in the first year as a
member of a "Great Books" seminar and thereafter as a leader of a
seminar on 'Justice and Society." The latter, the Justice Seminar, was
the product of his suggestion that mature and successful lawyers
would gain from a period of intensive and formalized discussion of
issues basic to their profession. I have been privileged to share all
seventeen seminars with Justice Blackmun. They work well. Values
are confirmed; a sense of purpose generated; and friendships formed.
Harry Blackmun provides the philosopher's stone that transmutes our
too-often self-serving words, if not to gold, at least to ideas of some
value. And he does it not by preaching but by his own manifest,
quiet, formidable intellectual integrity. Without affectation he
exposes his knowledge, beliefs, and values to our criticism, and
expects us to do likewise.
'We are colleagues for these two weeks," he says. "Call me Harry."
'Yes, Justice Blackmun," they reply. But this soon changes and,
though the respect endures, within days there is an ease of communi-
cation that generates a degree of openness rarely found among judges
and senior lawyers. Blackmun really does treat the great and the
humble of the world precisely alike. He has pride without hint of
pretense, precise honesty without trace of affectation-in brief,
absolute and unaffected integrity. It is a rare quality, and it gives
vigor and truth to our seminar and, in my view, to everything else that
he touches.
* Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Chicago Law School.
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Garrison Keillor called him "the shy person's justice." Those who
know his work habits call him a workaholic. His law clerks and
secretary say he is extremely disciplined. Those closest to him call
him very kind and thoughtful. He is an anathema to the anti-
abortionists, but a hero to the supporters of abortion rights. When
he was appointed, most Court watchers believed that he would be a
"conservative" voice, yet the media and those same Court watchers
now say he clearly is a leading member of the "liberal" wing of the
Court.
The question of what is a "conservative" and what is a "liberal" is
not easily answered. Whether the Justice has changed or society has
changed more is a question I leave to the reader of the tributes in
this issue.
The purpose of this brief tribute is to provide some of the Justice's
personal history and a few anecdotes which I hope will lead to a
better knowledge and understanding of this man who will leave an
enduring mark on U.S. judicial history.
Harry Andrew Blackmun was born on November 12, 1908, in
Nashville, Illinois. In 1910 the family moved to St. Paul, where
Blackmun attended grade school and high school. He continued his
education at Harvard College, was elected to Phi Beta Kappa, and
graduated summa cum laude in mathematics in 1929. He continued
his studies at Harvard Law School, graduating in 1932. While there,
he was a member of the group that won the Ames competition.
Judge John B. Sanborn of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit honored this young scholar, who would one day
succeed him, by picking Blackmun as his law clerk. Years later, Judge
Sanborn described Mr. Blackmun as his best-ever law clerk.
* General Counsel of the Mayo Clinic (retired).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
When he completed his clerkship in 1934, Mr. Blackmunjoined a
prestigious Minneapolis law firm, now known as Dorsey and Whitney.
His marriage to Dorothy Clark (whom he still affectionately calls "Miss
Clark") in 1941 led to the birth of three lovely and talented daugh-
ters, Nancy, Sally, and Susie. He became a junior and then a senior
partner at Dorsey before joining the Mayo Clinic as Resident Counsel
in 1950. He thus became one of the pioneer attorneys in medicolegal
matters, a field which has grown enormously and has attracted a large
number of attorneys since that time. Justice Blackmun's decision to
leave his highly successful legal practice for the Mayo Clinic melded
two of his primary professional interests, law and medicine. In fact,
before matriculating at Harvard Law, he seriously considered medical
school.
Mr. Blackmun was recognized as an expert in estate, trust, and tax
law while at the Dorsey firm, and he taught courses on these subjects
at both St. Paul College of Law (now William Mitchell) and the
University of Minnesota Law School. His career at Mayo included
membership on the boards of Rochester Airport Company, Rochester
Methodist Hospital (which he was instrumental in founding), and the
Mayo Association (now Mayo Foundation). He also was a director of
the Kahler Corporation, president of the Rochester Rotary Club (still
an honorary member), and an active member of his church. Mr.
Blackmun often has referred to those years in Rochester as his
happiest.
In 1959, Mr. Blackmun was appointed by President Eisenhower to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In 1970,
following his nomination by President Nixon and unanimous
confirmation by the U.S. Senate, he was sworn in as an Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
In Rochester, the Justice always mowed his own lawn (a large yard)
with a push mower, and he painted his own house. Stories about the
Justice's kindness, reasonableness, and unpretentiousness are legion.
Two anecdotes, of the many which could be recited, demonstrate:
one of the couples who lived near the Blackmuns in Rochester always
had admired the Blackmun home, which the Blackmuns had built
when they moved from Minneapolis to Rochester. The neighbors
often mentioned their interest in purchasing the home, if and when
the Blackmuns wanted to sell it. When the Justice's appointment to
the Supreme Court was confirmed, the Justice asked the neighbors if
they still would like to purchase the home. When asked for the price,
the Justice's response was a reasonable figure, according to the
neighbors, but one they could not afford. The Justice then asked
732 [Vol. 43:731
HARRY A. BLACKMUN
what they could afford. The neighbors thought for a moment, then
gave a figure about $20,000 less (a lot of money anytime, but
especially so in 1970). The Justice's response was "fine," and the
house was sold to the neighbors at that price without any haggling.
When the time to move to Washington, D.C. drew near, and
moving plans were discussed with the FBIJustice Blackmun indicated
his intention to drive from Rochester to the Capitol in his Volkswagen
Beetle. This probably would have been a first for a Supreme Court
designee. Alas, objections from the FBI prevented the trip in this
fashion, but he did take the Beetle to Washington, where he drove it
for many years, even driving it to the White House for social events.
A picture of his beloved Beetle still graces the mantel in his chambers.
Because of these and numerous other similar Blackmun stories,
those who knew the Justice before his appointment were not surprised
at his interests in the disadvantaged and in the protection of human
rights for all.
An extremely disciplined man, the Justice arrives at the Court
(always early), meets with his law clerks, eats lunch, exercises in the
court gym and leaves for home (always late) at the same times each
day. Some of his close friends have humorously claimed that his
careful planning is evidence in the births of his three daughters, all
of whom were born in the first week of July. As close Blackmun
observers, his then partners in the Dorsey office kiddingly would say
to him that they would not permit a vacation with his wife in the first
week in October.
Despite theJustice's professional accomplishments and his countless
honors, including numerous honorary degrees, he has managed to
maintain his equilibrium-always self-effacing and good-humored.
The Justice's presence on the Court will be missed in many ways.
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ESTELLE H. ROGERS*
I have never met Justice Harry Blackmun, but this is a purely
personal tribute. When I was a third year law student, the Supreme
Court announced its decision in Roe v. Wade.' I must confess that I
have absolutely no recollection of where I was, what I felt, or whether
I read the opinion (then). Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,2 the case that validated busing as a method of achieving
school desegregation, was also decided while I was in law school and
is much more vivid in my memory.
I do not remember reading Roe then, but I have read it many times
since, having spent the better part of my career as a proud member
of the Roe v. Wade legal and political defense team. The significance
of this opinion, and of all the elements of the ongoing debate it
foreshadowed, is difficult to overestimate. It is true, as Justice
Blackmun has often reminded us, that he was writing for a seven-man
majority. Yet, no one else could have written it quite the way he did.
It was clearly the product of his experiences, of his appreciation for
the medical profession, and of his respect for women.
While the opinion's constitutional scholarship has been debated, its
profound impact on women's equality is undeniable. The simple
proposition that women are entitled to self-determination in private
matters relating to childbearing profoundly changed our ability to
participate in the economic, political, and social life of this country.
The Court's recognition that the decision to terminate a pregnancy
is fundamentally a medical decision for the patient in consultation
with her doctor,3 subject to government regulation under limited
* Director of Public Policy, A.C.L.U. Reproductive Freedom Project.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
3. Actually, Justice Blackmun said "the attending physician, in consultation with his
patient," 410 U.S. at 163, but I doubt that he would put it that way today.
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circumstances, expanded our life options as surely as any civil rights
statute ever did.
Like any important decision of the Supreme Court, Roe v. Wade
began a longer odyssey than it ended. Instead of merely settling a
controversy between the parties, it unleashed a firestorm of opposition
and resistance that continues to this day.
I suspect that the virulence of the reaction to Roe v. Wade was
something of a surprise to Justice Blackmun. Surely he would not
have predicted his personal vilification. Interestingly, however, he
anticipated almost all of the attempts to derogate from this legal
landmark, this great victory for women, in the text of the opinion
itself. The role of women in society, the medical risks of abortion and
childbirth, the point when life begins-these are the same issues we
are still arguing about in the courts, in the legislatures, and, fortunate-
ly or unfortunately, in the streets.
The reason for the prescience of this opinion is simple. Contrary
to the way it has been popularly portrayed, Roe v. Wade is the
compromise that so many claim to be seeking. It struck a balance
between the competing rights and interests in the matter. Conse-
quently, it presaged the terms of the abortion debate to come with
amazing accuracy.
Ever since January 22, 1973, and in every state in the Union, Roe v.
Wade has been under attack. The battlegrounds and the results have
varied, but the essential issues have remained constant: whether,
when, where, and for what reason a woman will be permitted to
exercise her right to terminate a pregnancy, the same right of privacy
we thought we had won in Roe. As the attacks have grown more
relentless,Justice Blackmun seems to have become ever more vigilant.
The human consequences of forced pregnancy and excessive
regulation of abortion have assumed a central role in his writing
about reproductive rights. Moreover, his appreciation for the crucial
importance of reproductive autonomy in the progress of women has
deepened over time.
It is strangely fitting that Justice Blackmun has announced his
retirement in the year that Roe has attained the age of majority. It is
almost as if he cannot watch over it anymore; he must let it go. One
only wishes that we could be more confident that Roes longevity as an
"adult" is secure. I, for one, do not wish to ascribe motives to the
Justice. But, by making way for a youngerJustice to be appointed by
this President, he has perhaps made Roe's future more secure.
One thing is certain. That pivotal moment in legal history when
Roe v. Wade was announced in the awe-inspiring Supreme Court
1994]
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chamber irrevocably changed the lives of millions of American
women: women who have babies, women who have abortions, and
women who have both; women whose children are planned and
women who make mistakes; women who have problem-free pregnan-
cies and women for whom bearing children is the riskiest of proposi-
tions; and, perhaps the most important, women whose tender years
hardly qualify them as women at all. On behalf of all of us, I thank
him.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN
HERMAN SCHWARTZ*
Justice Blackmun's retirement from the Court removes a voice that
will not easily be replaced. Humane, personal, with a sense of both
current and past reality, he breathed life into what must often seem
abstract and dusty stuff to non-lawyers. Few people manage to retain
these qualities after donning their robes; stiff formality is the norm.
Justice Blackmun was one of the exceptions.
When President Nixon named Justice Blackmun to the Court, The
New York Times described him as "mildly conservative."' It noted,
however, that he had shown a concern for civil rights and the
underprivileged in several of his opinions.2 This concern grew
duringJustice Blackmun's years on the Court, and by the time he had
retired, he had become the most liberal member of the current
Supreme Court.
Justice Blackmun's sensitivity to the plight of those on the short end
of life's stick early in his judicial career supports his observation that
he had not changed much, but the Court had.3 Nevertheless, the
Justice Blackmun who repudiated his earlier support for capital
punishment in Callins v. Collins,4 and protested the Court's refusal to
find an affirmative obligation in state welfare authorities to protect
little Joshua DeShaney against beatings by his father,5 seems to be a
very different person indeed from the Justice Blackmun who wrote
* Professor of Law, The American University, Washington College of Law.
1. Robert Semple, Jr., Judge Blackmun of Minnesota Is Named to Supreme Court Seat by the
President, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1970, at Al.
2. Id
3. SeeJoan Biskupic, An Ideological Odyssey Nears End;Jurist Says He Was Not Transformed: 'The
Court Has Changed', WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1994, at Al (describing Justice Blackmun's Supreme
Court career).
4. 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1128 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(arguing that death penalty is "fraughtwith arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake").
5. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (dissenting from decision that county had no affirmative duty to
protect abused child).
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United States v. Kras,6 which denied bankruptcy relief to someone who
could not afford the filing fee, supported capital punishment in
Furman v. Georgia,7 and approved censorship in the Pentagon Papers
case, New York Times Co. v. United States.'
For these and other reasons, the Justice seems to confirm the
conventional wisdom that Presidents are usually disappointed in how
their Supreme Court appointments turn out. This, however, is not
really true. Mostjustices act exactly as the Presidents who chose them
wanted them to.9 While presidents may sometimes be unhappy with
their nominees' legal positions, this disappointment will often be on
new issues that the President did not foresee, or contemporaneous
issues he did not care about. President Eisenhower, for example, did
not use a philosophical test for his choices: ChiefJustice Earl Warren
was chosen because of a preelection arrangement that Warren would
get the first available Supreme Court seat. Indeed, when ChiefJustice
Fred Vinson died, Eisenhower and his Attorney General Herbert
Brownell tried to persuade Warren to let them appoint someone else
and to take the next vacancy. Warren refused, and the rest, of course,
is history."
Nor could President Richard Nixon have been too surprised or
upset by Justice Blackmun." Abortion was not an issue to which
Nixon paid any attention in 1970, and affirmative action, whichJustice
6. 409 U.S. 434, 447 (1973) (holding that state requirement of filing fee for declaring
bankruptcy has "rational basis" and is not violative of indigents' equal protection rights).
7. 408 U.S. 238, 375 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (dissenting from decision that
found death penalty to be "cruel and unusual punishment" under Eighth Amendment).
8. 403 U.S. 713, 752 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (dissenting from opinion that
refused to enjoin newspapers from publishing classified study of U.S. policy in Vietnam).
9. Two famous examples of this so-called "disappointment" are President Theodore
Roosevelt's unhappiness withJustice Oliver Wendell Holmes over the latter's refisal to join the
Court in striking down the Northern Securities merger under the Sherman Antitrust Act, and
President Dwight Eisenhower's unhappiness with ChiefJustice Earl Warren. But on the crucial
issue of the early 20th century, the Court's interference in state efforts to regulate the economy,
Holmes voted consistently as Roosevelt wanted. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65
(1905) (Holmes,J., dissenting). Eisenhower did not deplore Warren's segregation decision, the
most important case pending when Warren was chosen, STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER: THE
PRESIDENT 128-29, 190-91 (1984), nor did he regret the choice of Warren as ChiefJustice until
the 1960s, when the Court issued its criminal law and national security decisions, id. at 190. By
this time Eisenhower had moved sharply to the right.
10. See AMBROSE, supra note 9, at 128.
11. See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1128 n.1 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (noting that as Eighth Circuit judge, Blackmun had voted to enforce
death penalty even while publicly doubting its "moral, social, and constituional legitimacy")
(citing Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc), vacated, 392 U.S. 651
(1968); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 153-54 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated, 398 U.S. 262 (1970)).
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Blackmun has consistently supported, 2 was originated by Nixon with
the Philadelphia Plan in the construction industry.13
On the other hand, the primary reason Nixon chose Justice
Blackmun for the Supreme Court was to help undo the Warren
Court's protections for criminal defendants. And to a large extent,
Justice Blackmun has done so. He has consistently supported the
police in interrogation cases14 and opposed use of the Sixth Amend-
ment to protect suspects from questioning after formal proceedings
have commenced. 5 In search and seizure cases, he has voted to
adopt the good faith defense 6 and joined with the majority in
watering down probable cause in Illinois v. Gates," allowing broad
inventory searches in Colorado v. Bertine,' and in supporting random
drug-testing.' 9
12. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600-01 (1990) (holding
constitutional government program created to enhance minority ownership of radio stations);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 561 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from holding that city plan awarding construction contracts to "Minority Business
Enterprises" was unconstitutional); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concurring in part in judgment
upholding University affirmative action plan, but joining in dissent suggesting that majority
should have gone beyond "ethnic diversity" argument and reversed lower courtjudgment in all
respects).
13. RICHARD M. NIXON, THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 438 (1978) (expressing
disappointment that national black leaders were not more supportive of Philadelphia Plan).
14. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986) (holding that defendant was not
deprived of Miranda rights where police failed to tell him that attorney hired by defendant's
sister was trying to reach him); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (upholding
"public safety" exception to Miranda rule); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)
(holding defendant's inculpatory statements admissible where it could not be said that police
officers should have known that their conversation in defendant's presence was reasonably likely
to elicit incriminating response); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1975) (holding
defendant's statements made after asking to telephone lawyer admissible at trial for impeach-
ment purposes).
15. See, e.g., Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,459 (1986) (holding that Sixth Amendment
rights are not violated when paid informant is placed in cell, but makes no effort to stimulate
conversations involving crime charged); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 277 (1980)
(Blackmun,J., dissenting) (dissenting from holding that defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
were violated when government elicited incriminating statements from defendant through use
of paid government informant placed in same jail cell); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 429
(1977) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (dissenting from holding that defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights were violated when, despite agreementwith attorney, officer transporting defendant made
"Christian burial" speech designed to elicit incriminating testimony).
16. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,927 (1984) (Blackmun,J., concurring) (concurring
in judgment upholding good faith exception to exclusionary rule where officers acted in
"objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant").
17. 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (rejecting two-pronged Aguilar and Spinelli test in favor of
"totality of the circumstances" test).
18. 479 U.S. 367, 376 (1987) (Blackmun,J., concurring) (concurring in opinion that held,
absent bad faith, evidence found during inventory search of van was admissable).
19. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989) (holding
suspicionless drug-testing of employees applying for positions involving interdiction of illegal
drugs or carrying of firearms to be reasonable under Fourth Amendment); Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (holding that where railway employees were
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In short, where criminal procedure is concerned, Justice Blackmun
has amply fulfilled Nixon's expectations. And, at least in the early
years, he did so in other areas as well. Not only did he vote for the
Government in the Pentagon Papers case 20 and in favor of capital
punishment,21 but he also provided an indispensable fifth vote
against city-suburban school desegregation orders in Milliken v
Bradley,22 a position explicitly supported by then-Solicitor General
Robert Bork for the Nixon administration as amicus curiae.2 3 This
ruling effectively destroyed any realistic chance of desegregating our
inner cities.
It is unlikely that Justice Blackmun would vote that way today. A
measure of his flexibility and capacity for growth is his 1985 opinion
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.24 In 1976, the
Court in National League of Cities v. Usery25 overturned Maryland v.
Wirtz,26 which had upheld application of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act to state employees under the Commerce Clause. In
the name of States' rights, a 5-4 majorityjoined an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist ruling that the Commerce Clause could not be used to
authorize direct federal regulation of traditional state activities of the
"States qua States."28 Justice Blackmun concurred uneasily, stressing
that the ruling would not apply where "the federal interest is
demonstrably greater.
21
Not surprisingly, judicially determining what is "traditional" turned
out to be hopeless. Furthermore, as Justice Blackmun said in Garcia,
it really has nothing to do with the purpose of National League of Cities,
which was to allow the States room to manage those affairs that the
subject to warrantless, suspicionless drug tests, compelling government interest in public safety
outweighed employees' privacy concerns).
20. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
22. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding improper multidistrict remedy for single-district dejure
desegregation).
23. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(No. 73-434) (1973), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs (Microform, Inc.).
24. 469 U.S. 528, 555 (1985) (overturning National League of Cities v. User),, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), and holding that transit authority was not immune from minimum wage and overtime
requirements of Fair Labor Standards Act).
25. 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976) (holding that Congress may not exercise power to regulate
cohnmerce to force states to make essential decisions regarding exercise of integral governmental
functions).
26. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
27. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 188-90 (1968) (finding that Congress had "rational
basis" for applying FLSA to state employees).
28. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 847, 853.
29. Id. at 856.
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Constitution entrusts to the States.' And so Justice Blackmun
switched and joined the National League of Cities dissenters to overturn
that decision and to leave such questions to the political process."'
Some commentators have mocked this resolution as unrealistic, 2
but Justice Blackmun and the rest of the Garcia majority proved far
wiser than their academic critics. In less than a year, and without
even a roll-call vote, the cities and states adversely affected by Garcia
succeeded in getting Congress to overturn the specific ruling of that
case and to exempt them from the Act.3
In at least three of the most controversial areas into which the
Court has stepped during his tenure-privacy, affirmative action, and
religion and the state-Justice Blackmun has been totally consistent.
The first is, of course, highlighted by Roe v. Wade34 and his powerful
dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick3 5
As to Roe, little can be added here to what has been said elsewhere.
It has been severely criticized, even by those who believe women
should have a right to choose to have an abortion. But which great
pioneering decision has not? 36 Some have suggested that the matter
should have been left wholly to the states because legislative abortion-
law reform efforts were underway in many parts of the country.37
But what of the many women in Pennsylvania, Missouri, Minnesota,
Ohio, and other states where Catholic and other pressure groups have
fought bitterly and successfully-at least at the state and local
legislative level-against any effort to lower the barriers to abortion?
Why would people who profoundly abhor abortion because they
consider it murder react with any less hostility and effort to legislative
30. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531 (overturning National League of Cities having found that "attempt
to draw the boundary of state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental
function' is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism
and, indeed, with those very federalism principles on which National League of Cities purported
to rest").
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1709, 1724
n.64 (1985) ("[I1t is difficult to take the political science portion of the whole 'safeguards'
argument [in Garcia] as other than a good-hearted joke.").
33. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1988); see also Herman
Schwartz, Federalism Then and Now, CAL. LAw., Aug. 1987, at 52.
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing constitutional right to abortion based on trimester
framework).
35. 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (dissenting from decision that
found state sodomy statute did not violate homosexuals' fundamental rights).
36. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. LOCKHART Er AL, CONSTrrnrIONAL LAw 8-14, 1236-37 (1980)
(noting criticism of Supreme Court decisions in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), which gave federal courts right to find acts of Congress unconstitutional, and Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S 483 (1954), which desegregated schools).
37. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Bill of Rights and Regression to the Mean, 15 HARV.J. L & PUB.
POL 71, 77 (1992).
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efforts to legalize abortion than to judicial? New York's legislature
reformed its abortion law in 1970 during a midnight session by a one-
vote margin." George Michaels, the upstate New York legislator who
switched sides at the last minute to cast the deciding vote, promptly
lost his seat in the next election.3 9
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has suggested that the decision should
not only have been limited to a simple annulment of the Texas ban
but should also have "honed in more on the women's equality
dimension of the issue" and on women's autonomy as Planned
Parenthood v. Case4 did.41  But the law of equality for women was
still very undeveloped in 1973, with only Reed v. Reed 2 on the books.
And would basing the decision on so vague a legislative fact as
women's increasing role in the world have drawn any less criticism in
1973?
As to gradualism, the history of "all deliberate speed" in the school
desegregation area offers at least one historical example where the
gradual approach probably did more harm than good.43 Such
gradualism seems particularly inappropriate where abortion is
concerned, for multitudes of women would have been denied legal
abortions while this gradualism, this "dialogue with legislators" that
Justice Ginsburg apparently prefers,' was going on. And how
fruitful would that dialogue have been? One cannot help wondering
how many dialogues Justice Ginsburg has had with state and local
legislators on politically or socially controversial matters.
The other two incendiary areas where Justice Blackmun has been
quite consistent are affirmative action and religion and the state.
With respect to affirmative action, Justice Blackmun saw the essence
of the problem right from the beginning. In his opinion in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke,45 he wrote, "In order to get
38. Act of Apr. 11, 1970, ch. 127, 1970 N.Y. Laws 852; see also Wolfgang Saxon, George
Michaels, 80, Legislator Who Changed Abortion Law, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1992, at A27
(describing legislator George Michaels' emotional last-minute switch of vote from "yes" to "no,"
allowing legislation to pass, and his subsequent loss in June 1970 primary).
39. See Saxon, supra note 34, at A27.
40. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (replacing trimester abortion framework with "undue burden"
test).
41. Ruth B. Ginsburg, Speaking in ajudicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1200 (1992).
42. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding statute giving preference to males over females in
administering estates unconstitutional on equal protection grounds).
43. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (criticizing
three-year-old "freedom of choice plan" that had failed to integrate schools and ordering
creation of new plan that would promptly desegregate system).
44. Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 1205 (suggesting that Roe v. Wade "seemed entirely to
remove the ball from the legislator's court").
45. 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other
way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently."46 Eleven years later, a new majority reversed course and
in a cruelly myopic opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
implicitly equated the denial to a white contractor of a Richmond,
Virginia construction contract with lynchings and the other atrocities
inflicted on blacks by white racism.4 7 Justice Blackmun wrote:
I never thought that I would live to see the day when the city of
Richmond, Virginia, the cradle of the Old Confederacy, sought on
its own, within a narrow confine, to lessen the stark impact of
persistent discrimination. But Richmond, to its great credit, acted.
Yet this court, the supposed bastion of equality, strikes down
Richmond's efforts as though discrimination had never existed or
was not demonstrated in this particular litigation. 8
In the church-state area, he has been less vocal but equally
consistent. Since his earliest days on the Court, he has voted to
maintain a significant barrier between "the garden and the wilder-
ness."49 Starting with the landmark decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman,5 °
which established the now much-criticized three-part test, through his
dissent in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,5 he has supported
a high wall of separation.
Justice Blackmun's concern for the free exercise of religion has also
produced strongly voiced views. In Goldman v. Weinberger,52 and the
much criticized peyote case, Employment Division v. Smith,5" he issued
powerful, closely reasoned dissents on behalf of the individual
religious conscience against a regulation and a law that suppressed
religious practices. 4 In both cases, however, he was closer to what
46. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 488 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
47. City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding city plan awarding
construction contracts to "Minority Business Enterprises" unconstitutional).
48. Id. at 561-62 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
49. See MARK D. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 5 (1965) (describing Roger William's reference to
separating "the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world").
50. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (creating three-part "purpose," "effect," and "entanglement" test
for deciding Establishment Clause questions).
51. 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2469 (1993) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (dissenting from decision that
found that for State to provide interpreter to deaf student attending Catholic high school was
not violation of Establishment Clause).
52. 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that First Amendment did not prohibit military regulation
that prevented Orthodox Jewish serviceman from wearing yarmulke while on duty or in
uniform).
53. 494 U.S. 872 (1994) (holding that Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit application of
drug laws to ceremonial ingestion of peyote).
54. Goldmnah, 475 U.S at 524 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); Smith, 494 U.S. at 907 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
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the American people believed than the current Court majority-in
both cases, Congress overturned the Court decisions, thereby allowing
servicemen to wear headgear for religious reasons,55 and reestablish-
ing a compelling state interest test in free exercise cases.56
The opinion of which Justice Blackmun is proudest is not Roe v.
Wade, as one might expect, but an obscure prisoners' rights decision
in 1968, which stopped Arkansas prison officials from whipping prison
inmates as punishment. 7  Although it may not seem like much
today, in 1968 it was one of the earliest federal decisions to impose
any limitations on prison administrators.58 As one of his law clerks
recently wrote,
Judge Blackmun could not rely on well-established precedents; he
had to "glean" from earlier Supreme Court decisions a constitution-
al commitment to "flexibility and improvement in standards of
decency as society progresses and matures." His belief that "broad
and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and
decency are useful and usable" in interpreting specific constitution-
al provisions lay at the heart of "one of the first, possibly the first
appellate opinion[s] examining prison practices and holding them
unlawful under the eighth amendment."59
This early indication of humaneness and courage found its fullest
opportunity to develop and expand on the Supreme Court, and we
are a better people for that.
55. 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1988) (stating that member of armed forces may wear an item of
"religious apparel" while in uniform, unless the Secretary determines that wearing the item
would "interfere with the performance of the member's militray duties" or "is not neat and
conservative").
56. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb).
57. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
58. Herman Schwartz, The Burger Court and the Prisoner, in THE BURGER YEARS 97 (Herman
Schwartz ed., 1987).
59. Pamela S. Karlan, Bringing Compassion into the Province of Judging: Justice Blackmun and
the Outsiders, 97 DIcK. LR 527, 531 (1993) (citing Jackson, 404 F.2d at 579; Richard S. Arnold,
Mr. Justice Blachmun: An Appreciation, 8 HAMLINE L. REv. 20, 21 n.3 (1985)).
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HARRY A. BLACKMUN: THE
CONSCIENTIOUS CONSCIENCE
NINA TOTENBERG*
When I was twenty-six years old, I found myself in Rochester,
Minnesota researching the life and times of a little-known appeals
court judge named Harry A. Blackmun. I had a tip he was President
Nixon's choice to fill a Supreme Court vacancy, and I was frantically
trying to figure out, before the hordes descended, just what sort of a
man the judge was.
What I learned was, in hindsight, rather prescient. On the Eighth
Circuit, Harry Blackmun was a moderate to liberal judge on social
issues. On the burning issue of the day, civil rights, he was a tough
enforcer. On the subject of prison conditions, he was a reformer,
writing a particularly noteworthy decision outlawing "the strap" in
Arkansas prisons.' And on matters involving the criminal law, he was
a moderate to conservative judge, a trend that has continued to the
present, except for the death penalty.
But when Harry A. Blackmun initially ascended to the Supreme
Court bench back in 1970, the newJustice seemed not much like the
centrist, kind-hearted man I had written about. The new Justice was
conservative enough to be paired in the press with Chief Justice
Warren Burger as "The Minnesota Twins," and perhaps more
surprisingly, he seemed to lack any generosity of spirit, lashing out at
the poor in a case involving court fees for bankruptcy filings,2 lashing
out at the press as unpatriotic in the pentagon papers case.s
The psychological and intellectual puzzle of Harry Blackmun has
always been: what made him change, or is it as he has always
maintained, that he did not change, the Court did. The answer, I
think, is both, and neither. It has always seemed to me that Justice
* Legal Affairs Correspondent, National Public Radio.
1. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
2. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
3. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 759 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Blackmun's first couple of years on the Court were an aberration in
his legal career.
The judge who served for eleven years on the Eighth Circuit would
never have written the gratuitously unkind words that Justice
Blackmun wrote in United States v. Kras4 upholding a $50 bankruptcy
filing fee. "If the payment period is extended for the additional three
months as the Order permits, the average weekly payment is lowered
to $1.28. This is a sum less than the payments Kras makes on his
couch of negligible value in storage, and less than the price of a
movie and little more than the cost of a pack or two of cigarettes."'
(Justice Marshall noted in dissent that there was no evidence that Kras
smoked.) Contrast those harsh words about a $50 filing fee to words
he wrote about a $40 pathology requirement in Planned Parenthood v.
Ashcroft6 ten years later:
I cannot agree with Justice Powell that Missouri's pathologist
requirement has "no significant impact" on a woman's exercise of
her right to an abortion. It is undisputed that this requirement
may increase the cost of a first-trimester abortion by as much as
$40. Although this increase may seem insignificant from the
Court's comfortable perspective, I cannot say that it is equally
insignificant to every woman seeking an abortion. For the woman
on welfare or the unemployed teenager, this additional cost may
put the price of an abortion beyond reach.7
So what accounts for that brief aberrational period, the period in
which Justice Blackmun was categorized by the press as a lockstep
conservative, something he had never been before and would never
be again?
My theory, after talking to many Blackmun law clerks and friends
of that period, is that he was simply overwhelmed by the enormity of
the newjob, and that for a brief moment in his judicial career, he was
frozen in an uncharacteristic posture-unforgiving of the human
condition.
I tested this theory many years ago while on one of those TV
talking-head shows. A couple of months after the show, I had
occasion to speak to the Justice. To my surprise, he said he had
"caught my act," and with a twinkle, commended me for my "percep-
tiveness." I hope I read him correctly.
4. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
5. Kras, 409 U.S. at 449.
6. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
7. Planned Parenthoodv. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,497-98 (1983) (Blackmun,J,, dissenting)
(citations omitted).
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The Blackmun odyssey is, of course, more complicated than that.
He said as much when I interviewed him last November. "When one
reaches here," said Blackmun, "he has to decide where he's going."
"After all, what do these broad phrases of our Constitution really
mean? What is due process of law? What is equal protection of the
law and all the other great phrases that the Founding Fathers put in
there?"
"On the court of appeals, sure, every now and then we had
constitutional issues and we'd do the best we could to decide them.
But we always had the comfort of knowing that there were nine
persons down in Washington who could straighten this out if we were
wrong and who had the last say anyway. This is the end of the line.
So, I think as each constitutional case comes along, one makes his
mind up over the years, his constitutional approach and philosophy
become a little more fixed."'
While there is no doubt that the Court's center of gravity has
moved dramatically to the right since Justice Blackmun joined the
Court, there is also no doubt his center of gravity has moved too. As
many have observed, his emphasis in Roe v. Wade was on the
physician's right to counsel his or her patients and on the health
consequences of making abortion illegal. But by the 1980s, Blackmun
saw abortion principally as a women's rights issue, "I fear for the
liberty and equality of the millions of women who have lived and
come of age in the 16 years since Roe was decided."9 And while he
initially seemed to harbor no doubts about the constitutionality of the
death penalty, he has for the past six or seven years talked privately
about his increasing doubt as to whether capital punishment could be
fairly and equitably administered. Indeed, an opinion to that effect
has circulated for several years in his chambers. Finally, this term, he
made the leap, and dissented from a denial of certiorari in Callins v.
Collins:' "From this day forward I shall no longer tinker with the
machinery of death."1
Blackmun's one-time law clerk Harold Koh tells a story that says
much about the Blackmun transformation on the death penalty, and
on other issues too. 2 Koh wrote that he was working late one night
8. Interview with HarryA. Blackmun, AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court of the United
States (Nov. 1993).
9. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
10. 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994).
11. Callinsv. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (Blackmun,J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
12. Harold H. Koh, AJusticeforPassion, 1990 ANN. SuRV. AM. L. xxxi.
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on petitions for certiorari. The last of the pile seemed simple
enough. The case had been up twice before and been denied. Koh
looked at the pool memo and scrawled "Deny" at the top. "But
something nagged," said Koh. "It occurred to me-as it did every day
that year, and as it has every day since-thatJustice Blackmun would
care more than this." 3
Koh went back to check the earlier denials and found all the
records, of course in perfect order in the Blackmun files. The old
pool memos at first looked straightforward. The defendant was
seeking habeas corpus relief from the death sentence. He had been
convicted, along with an accomplice, of murdering a family of four
while the accomplice's teenaged children watched. But written on the
last page of the first certiorari denial in the Justice's "perfect
handwriting" were the words, "What happened to the children?" and
below that a series of Supreme Court docket numbers.14
"The next hour was a blur," wrote Koh, "as I searched for and
found all of the old certiorari pool memos, each covered with the
Justice's detailed notations. 'Did the accomplice's children get the
death penalty?' he asked. 'Did they have criminal intent? Could
they?' 'Does the 8th [Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
clause] permit execution of minors? Of accomplices to felony
murder?"'15 The list of tiny citations and scribbled notes ran on for
pages. And at the bottom Blackmun had written in large letters,
"This is a certworthy issue."'
6
As Koh so accurately observed, "this was just one of perhaps a
million petitions for certiorari that Justice Blackmun disposed of"17
during nearly a quarter century on the Court, and it well illustrates
not only the man's passion for justice, but his devotion to it.
His devotion required him to look at every case, not just in
theoretical terms, but in human terms, and while it is a trait that
sometimes won him disdain, it also earned him respect. One suspects
that it is through the process of looking at the world through the eyes
of others less fortunate that he travelled the road from Harry
Blackmun, the "White Anglo-Saxon Protestant Republican Rotarian
Harvard Man from the Suburbs,""8 to Harry Blackmun, the defender
of the poor, the defenseless, those whom fortune has not smiled
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at xxxii.
18. Waltz, The Burger/Blackmun Court N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 61, quoted
in Koh, supra note 12, at xxxii.
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upon. He became their advocate as he did in Deshaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services,19 when he dissented from the
Court's holding that a government social services organization was not
liable for the continued brutal abuse of a child even though the
agency knew of the abuse. Deriding the Court majority for what he
called its "formalistic" and "rigid" interpretation of the Constitu-
tion,2" Blackmun wrote: "Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks
by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and
abandoned by respondents who placed him in a dangerous predica-
ment and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did
essentially nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes, 'dutifully
recorded these incidents in [their] files.'"21
Scholars will disagree, probably forever, about the Blackmun
approach, but it seems to me to be important to have at least one
voice like his on the Nation's highest court, one set of eyes that views
the law not just in theoretical terms.
"I like to know what people are thinking and what they're worried
about," he said in our interview a few months ago. "I think that's
important, because behind every case there are some individual
people, many times so-called little people, if I can use the phrase,
rather than just a name of Smith against Jones with a lot of legal
theory behind it. It's their Supreme Court. It doesn't belong to the
Congress or to the Chief Justice or to the Justices. It's the people's
Supreme Court, and to the extent we can keep it that way I prefer it."
19. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
20. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 213 (alteration in original).
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SARAH WEDDINGTON*
United States Supreme CourtJustice Harry A. Blackmun has had a
greater impact on the lives of American women than any other person
in at least the past half century. For twenty-one years, the 7-2 opinion
he authored, Roe v. Wade,' has been the epicenter of personal, social,
and political change. Because of it, women in the United States have
had the right to decide whether to continue or terminate a pregnancy
and therefore to determine many other aspects of their lives.
I was reminded of the powerful impact of his opinion recently while
in Orlando, Florida to speak to the B'nai B'rith Women Biennial
Convention. My remarks included comments about the past and
future of the abortion issue and aboutJustice Blackmun's retirement.
Once we feared this moment, but with President Clinton making the
appointment, it is predictable that a pro-RoeJustice will take that seat.
For the near future, I believe abortion will continue to be legal; the
question is whether it will be available.
Among those in Orlando who crowded around me afterwards for
discussion and further questions was a dark-haired woman with a
sparkling personality, a leader in her local young-adult chapter. As
she began to talk to me, her eyes filled with tears and her voice
choked. She was finally able to lean forward and say in my ear,
"Thank you for Roe v. Wade. You saved my life." I do not know the
specifics of her situation; I do not inquire in front of others about
information not volunteered.
As I think of her, other faces that have leaned forward through the
years flood back to me. Today I wish that I had a videotape of those
people to send to Justice Blackmun as he retires. I wish I could share
* Counsel for petitioner, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Adjunct Associate Professor
of Government, University of Texas-Austin. Author of A QUESTION OF CHOICE (1992).
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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with him their heart-felt comments about what a positive force Roe has
been in their lives.
I sawJustice Blackmun for the first time on December 13, 1971, the
day of the first Roe oral argument, and again on October 11, 1972, the
second argument. The group of lawyers asking the Court to declare
the Texas statute outlawing abortion (except to save the life of the
woman) unconstitutional had worked to include arguments that
would appeal to each Justice. We were aware that Justice Blackmun
had previously been counsel for the Mayo Clinic, an outstanding
medical facility in Minnesota. We had no information about what
Justice Blackmun's position on the case was likely to be, but he was
the Justice we had in mind as we crowded medically related informa-
tion into the primary brief and organized a separate amicus curiae
brief signed by leading doctors and medical professors.
The drama of the Supreme Court's consideration of the abortion
issue drew key participants in the debate from far and wide. I was a
young lawyer of twenty-six arguing my first contested case, a case I
wanted desperately to win. My memory of Justice Blackmun is of a
kindly, reserved man with greying hair, dark-framed glasses, and a soft
voice. His questions were scholarly and inquiring but neither
belligerent nor friendly. I was especially alert to his questions during
the second hearing because, by then, rumors were flying thatJustice
Blackmun was writing the opinion, that he had spent part of the 1972
summer at Mayo Clinic researching case issues, and that the Court was
preparing to overturn the Texas statute.
On January 22, 1973, Justice Blackmun read the Roe opinion from
the Supreme Court bench. It concluded that a woman's fundamental
right of personal privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." It also held
that the State of Texas had not proven a compelling reason to
regulate abortion. The immediate effect of the decision was to
overturn anti-abortion statutes in forty-six of the fifty states. Later I
pictured the decisionmaking ability of women expanding exponential-
ly as Justice Blackmun read the words of Roe.
I learned about the decision when a reporter from Washington,
D.C. called my Austin office. Moments later I received a three-line
telegram from the Court-collect. I don't remember the cost. My
phones went crazy: reporters wanted comments, supporters called to
celebrate, and the curious called to see exactly what the opinion said.
Many people tell me that they can still remember exactly where they
were and what they were doing when they heard about the decision
in Roe v. Wade.
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Surely that day Justice Blackmun never expected the Roe opinion
to be headline news at the time of his retirement. He, like I,
probably thought the basic issue was settled that day in 1973. A year
after the decision, I wrote to thank him for his role as draftsman. In
his response, Justice Blackmun wrote: "It meant much to have this
supportive letter from you at this time. There is always controversy
round about us, and this one seems to be particularly deep."2 How
prophetic his words were. With hindsight we now know that
defending the decision and its impact would occupy a great deal of
judicial time throughout his career.
For example, the issue of financial access to abortion has been
before the Supreme Court. In Beal v. Doe,' the Court held that
Medicaid did not require states to pay for poor women's abortions.
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun demonstrated his understanding of
the viewpoint of women in poverty:
The Court concedes the existence of a constitutional right but
denies the realization and enjoyment of that right on the ground
that realization and enjoyment are separate and distinct. For the
individual woman concerned, indigent and financially helpless, as
the Court's opinions.., concede her to be, the result is punitive
and tragic. Implicit in the Court's holdings is the condescension
that she may go elsewhere for her abortion. I find that disingenu-
ous and alarming, almost reminiscent of: "Let them eat cake."4
By 1989, the lasting power of Roe seemed tenuous because of
Supreme Court appointments made by anti-Roe Presidents Ronald
Reagan and George Bush. Justice Blackmun must have felt under
siege as he valiantly sought to defend Roe. In Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services,5 the Supreme Court approved new state restrictions on
abortion procedures and signaled that it might overturn Roe. Justice
Blackmun wrote in dissent:
I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of the
millions of women who have lived and come of age in the 16 years
since Roe was decided.6
Many citizens shared his fear. Blackmun, the oldest Justice, and
John Paul Stevens were the only Justices defending the original Roe
decision, four others were saying, "Let's get rid of Roe," and the
2. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Sarah Weddington, Representative, Texas
House of Representatives 1 (Mar. 8, 1974) (on file with The American University Law Review).
3. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
4. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 462 (1977) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
5. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
6. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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remaining three Justices were essentially saying, "We're not ready to
overturn Roe, but we are prepared to weaken it." One more anti-Roe
Justice could doom the decision. Justice Blackmun had commented
that he could not last forever.7 I believe many voters had Blackmun's
comment in mind as they cast their 1992 ballots for the presidential
candidate who pledged to protect privacy, Bill Clinton.'
Even as this Tribute goes to press, Justice Blackmun will once again
participate in deciding a case regarding access. In Madsen v. Women's
Health Center Inc.,9 the Court will review a Florida case involving
restrictions placed on clinic picketers who sought to hamper access to
an abortion clinic and to disrupt the doctors and patients inside.
At what cost has Justice Blackmun defended privacy and women's
right to make choices? He has read over 60,000 pieces of "hate mall"
received in the intervening years. He has been picketed, cursed,
threatened, and denounced. Even in announcing his retirement, he
commented that ajustice can choose when to retire but not the "tag"
assigned him or her. "Author of the abortion decision," he once said.
'Ve all pick up tags. I'll carry this one to my grave."'
0
I hope it is a tag that he wears with pride. His opinion, to a
significant degree, has been the source of expanded roles for women
in such areas as education, employment, and politics since 1973. As
Justice Blackmun retires, I wish we could fire a 21-gun salute, the
tribute this country extends to its highest and bravest. Then I wish I
could give him a videotape of the comments of millions of women,
and those who care about them, who thank him for the choices that
were theirs, not those of strangers or of government. Their faces have
kept me going all these years.
In this issue, various writers laud a diverse collection of characteris-
tics and opinions of Justice Harry A. Blackmun. I write in praise of
Justice Blackmun and his opinion in Roe v. Wade. Many priorJustices
have been forgotten, but history and especially American women will
never forget his work as a U.S. Supreme CourtJustice. On behalf of
many, I send a hug and a heart-felt "Thank you, we're glad you were
there." May your days of retirement pleasures be many, and may you
always know and relish the valuable difference you have made in the
lives of so many!
7. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2854 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8. Mitchell Locin, With Court Choice, Clinton Gets a Chance to Regain Momentum, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 7, 1994, at A15 ("[M]any-particularly women- . . voted for (Clinton) ... because they
did not want a Republican president to nominate any more justices.").
9. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr. Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993), cert. granted,
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr. Inc., 114 S. Ct. 907 (1994) (No. 93-880).
10. Blackmun Accepts Aftermath of WitingAbortion Opinion, N.Y. TIMEs,Jan. 18, 1983, at A20.
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